


# SOCIETY IN EVOLUTION



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## PREFACE

In the present state of the science of sociology it is rash to venture beyond the monograph on some special topic, to discuss the subject as a whole. The present volume is not intended as a systematic reconstruction of the principles of sociology, even in outline. Its aim is rather practical. Several classes of students to-day are directing more and more attention to the science of society, with the purpose of finding a more scientific basis for their work. The minister would infuse religion into the social relations of every-day life, and seeks to understand society, which he would make religious. Touched with a deep sense of human woe, "ethical" reformers find that material aid and education, and even friendship, cannot meet the wants of the individual, but that they must learn to know society, and work through society, in order to help the man. The effort to administer charity wisely; the effort to make criminals into men, and to prevent men from becoming criminals; the effort to develop a sounder municipal life in our cities, and a truer

political sentiment in our nations—these are but some of the lines of work in which men to-day are driven to study the science of society, in order that they may not do harm where they would do good. Moreover, students of politics, of economics, of psychology and philosophy, of history, are turning more and more attention to the sociological basis of their work. It has been my aim to furnish a brief introduction to the subject, which would make plain to the reader something of its scope and importance, and, it may be, aid him in further study. That the specialist in sociological investigation will find much here to advance the knowledge of the science, is not my expectation.

I have to thank Mr. Ghatak, Superintendent of the University Press, and his efficient staff for their unfailing courtesy and care when the book was in the Press.

R. KHAN.



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# SOCIETY IN EVOLUTION

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## INTRODUCTION

Sociology is the name applied to a rather inchoate mass of materials which embodies our knowledge about society. Careful students and sentimental reformers alike profess devotion to the new science. Economics is to be a branch of sociology; theology is to be driven from the pulpit by the new religion of social reform; law and morals may be put on a true foundation, the state at last may learn its true function, and the family its true meaning, because this new science has been discovered toward the close of the nineteenth century. Its forms are as yet varied, and perhaps would suggest a series of pseudo-sciences instead of one genuine science. Spencer uses the term sociology to mean the study of social institutions in their origin and development; Letourneau applies it to the study of social beginnings, and it has been extended to cover a good deal of ethnology and anthropology; Comte, who has the honour of inventing

the word *sociologie*, meant by it the goal and summation of all science as applied to the regulation of human society; in America the name has been applied indifferently to any study of social conditions which aims to regenerate society. Such are some of the claims put forward by the devotees of this new science, and some of the various types which it has assumed. In view of all this confusion and perplexity, it must be the first work of the student to define the scope of this science, if such it be, and to determine its relation to other sciences already recognised as such. Accordingly, I propose first to define the object to be studied, *viz.*, society or the social group, and to indicate the importance of such a study; secondly, to discuss the relation of the general science of society to the special sciences dealing with particular classes of social phenomena; and, thirdly, to enquire whether the study of society as thus defined deserves the name of a science.

## I

Sociology claims to be the science of society and the question immediately arises: what is society, or a society, this object which is to be studied? To-day many writers talk freely of society, and mean by it on one page, *humanity*; on the next, a *family*, or a *race*; on the next,



*social intercourse.* Those writers who regard society as an organism are perhaps the most careless in this matter, and confuse the reader by including in said organism at one time the world as a whole, and again, without notice of change, some small group of men who have united for a definite purpose.

A society may be defined as a group of men who live together in relations more or less permanent. [V. Gumpłowicz, *Grundriss der Sociologie*, pp. 139, sqq.]. For scientific purposes men are grouped in classes which include those who are alike and exclude others; such a group is not a society, for it exists only in the mind of the thinker. On the other hand the company in a railway car includes most diverse characters, but even so casual a relation may bind them into a sort of society. Persons in the same audience are a society when their minds are united even temporarily by a common interest in the speaker. The family perpetuating the same life for generations, is a society. A society is a group of persons sharing a common life for a longer or shorter time; but inasmuch as there is an important distinction between the smaller societies developed to perform a definite function, and the larger society in which these exist, I shall frequently call the former "social organs" or "social groups." These intervene between the individual and the

larger society to which he belongs ; they constitute the frame-work or structure of that society ; in the language of biology they may be called its organs.

The word "society" then may be applied to the larger body in which the social groups exist. A society differs from these smaller groups in that it is not called into existence to perform any definite function, for apparently it exists to be served rather than to serve. It does not always coincide with a city or other local group, or with a nation, the political group ; the word covers more nearly the same grounds as the term *people*. In general a society coincides with a type of culture. "Society" meant for the Jew, the Hebrew race ; for the Greek, those whom Greek culture brought under its sway or made to contribute immediately to its progress ; for the Roman, the Roman world, those who acknowledged the dominion of Rome. To-day "society," in the broad use of the term means for the Christians those who have yielded to the influence of Christian civilisation ; and we seem to foresee the day when all the larger and more important ethnic groups may be regarded as parts of one society, because they share the same culture and the same civilisation.

The object which sociology proposes to study is society as a whole, together with the smaller societies or social groups which are developed

to perform special functions in the life of the larger whole. But while it is only the group as a society which properly comes within the sphere of sociology, it is evident that various types of social classes must be examined in order to understand the groups which may be called societies. Life in the same locality and identity of race are the basis of classes which all but inevitably become social groups sharing a common psychical life, so that these classes cannot be neglected by sociology. In similar manner the classes which are developed in an advanced state of society, classes according to rank, according to occupation, according to economic and moral condition, etc., must be considered by sociology because of their influence on the groups which may be recognised distinctly as societies. After this has been granted, the student should never forget that the real object of sociological study is not classes of men that are alike, but groups of men who have come to share a common life.

So important a subject as this has, of course, received some attention before the rise of a branch of science entirely devoted to the consideration of it. Even when the historian has commanded the reader's imagination by selecting great men for his theme, the true student has recognised that it is the ideals of the nation which find expression in their lives. The study

of leaders in thought and action deserves the name of history, not because these leaders are the only men worth studying, but because the study of their lives may let us see inside the real life of the nation. The real subject of history is the life of a people, the development of the groups which go to make up this life and the way in which these groups act together to form the larger whole.

The attempt to apply the doctrine of evolution to society and to the results of social life has shown the importance of the social group as an object of study. It is the group quite as much as the individual which is subject to the law of natural selection and the survival of the fittest. Among savages these groups may be small and subject to change; still it is groups, rather than individuals, which compete with each other for the means of existence. The members of a group shield each other from the full effect of the natural laws of survival, so that the very existence of these laws has been questioned; but in the struggle of group with group they are seen operating in full force. The influences of climate and physical environment affect the size, activity, and energy of the group quite as much as they affect the individual life. Turning from primitive society to society highly civilised, we find that still the members of a group shield each other, while group struggles

with group. The weakest child receives the most care in the family ; the trade-union means that labourer stands by labourer ; the great function of the nation is to protect its citizens from internal lawlessness and from external attack. Every social institution unites men good and bad into one social group, which stands or falls as a unit in the struggle with similar competitors. The laws of natural selection apply to the social group, and this is, therefore, the important unit in the process of social evolution.

But while the study of the social group has been recognised as important, and has been emphasised in some developments of modern thought, its full meaning has been generally neglected. Law, philosophy, and especially religion, have tended to exaggerate the importance of the individual as the social unit, and the vital connection between individuals has been overlooked. The example of psychology will illustrate the results of this atomistic study of individuals. We speak of the "old psychology," but psychology, both old and new, has ordinarily stopped with the individual mind ; the new psychology differs from the old in that it applies scientific method to the study of mind as a physical organism in a physical environment ; it does not emphasise the environment of mind by mind, and it is inclined to overlook the distinctively human faculties

which are developed in this psychical environment. History tells us how psychologists have invented doctrines of innate ideas to cover what their study of the individual did not explain; how language and religion have been regarded alternately as the gift of God, and the invention of cunning men; how the highest ideals of the race, ideals of truth, of beauty, of goodness, have been at one time treated as intuitions implanted in the individuals by an extra-mundane power, at another time entirely overlooked or denied. In a word, man has been stripped of the psychical powers which are his inheritance as a social being, and upon the naked skeleton of a mind thus obtained, psychologists have thrust what garments they would. The individual person exists in society, and any true study of the individual must recognise the dependence of his habits, his ideals, and all his intellectual activity, upon the psychical life of the group of which he is a member.

There may be some excuse for thinkers who have neglected the social factor in their study of the individual, but I can see no shadow of excuse for the way in which individualistic ages, like the present, have sought to understand society without looking beyond the individuals which make up society. Two problems are proposed to the child under the name of mathematics: If one acre will yield twenty bushels of wheat, how

much will six acres yield? If a man can make one table a day, how many can ten men make? The vital difference between these two questions does not appear in the first chapters of the arithmetic. The ten men may labour as an association, and no study of the unit will suffice to determine the product of the group. The typical man of economics is defined as having social instincts, but unless the social organs for production, distribution, etc., are carefully investigated, economics is one-sided, if not barren. The politics which began with the freedom and equality of all men, and yet forgot that they were brothers, has done good service, but its fruits do not justify its claim to scientific truth.

Various types of social philosophy have failed, because their attention was centred on the individual. The theory of natural rights and natural law, and in like manner the social contract theory, suffered from this defect. They began with an abstraction, *viz.*, individuals apart from society, and they ended with an abstraction, a "natural" or a "contractual" government. In contrast with these are the theories of the idealist philosophers, who would willingly make a place for society in their system. They have equipped the idealistic *individual* with countless social instincts and social notions, but even then they fail to explain society, for the problem is not fairly stated. And one is inclined

to think that even those students who have most clearly recognised the organic character of society, have been unable to escape entirely from the habit of studying primarily the individual. Spencer begins his *Principles of Sociology* with an elaborate reconstruction of the primitive man ; and Mr. Ward, in his study of the dynamics of society, hardly recognises social organs and activities at all, but devotes his attention to the individual as a potential member of society.

It is not difficult to see that the study of human nature, of man as man, and the study of human society, run parallel, and should always complement each other. The student of physical nature posits molecules and atoms as the individual units in the realm of nature, and he seeks to explain the aggregate and these units in terms of each other. The atom studied by itself cannot explain the aggregate, for the atom is a mere abstraction never existing by itself. The forces at work in the crystal or in the plant, are the forces which chemistry and physics have made most familiar to us ; but chemistry and physics are not the whole of natural science, for the study of atom and molecule by themselves does not reveal the properties of their combinations. In the study of physical nature, it is clear (1) that the unit and the aggregate are not separate things, and so are to



be studied, not as separate things, but rather as interacting parts in one whole ; and (2) that the properties of the combination cannot be fully ascertained by studying units which are formed by abstraction.

It is equally true in the study of human nature that the individual and society are not separate things, so that neither can be fully understood when they are studied separately. It is easy to forget that the human individual, when separated from his mental and moral environment, is an unreal abstraction—a mere possibility of becoming a man. Further, it is true that society is a composite whole, the properties of which cannot be fully ascertained by any study of the single person. In the animal, atoms and molecules interact upon each other to produce new results, by reason of their organic relation, and the organic whole maintains a definite relation both to its component parts and to its environment. In society, the units interact upon each other, and determine each other in new ways because of their relation. A man growing up in solitude would know some forms of pleasure and pain ; he could not understand all the phenomena of love and hate, of anger and pity, of sympathy and revenge, for these can only exist as man touches man in society. Again, society as a whole maintains a definite relation to its constituent factors. Laws and

moral ideals, custom and public opinion, shape the lives of individuals; and in these lives they are born anew, to determine the character of the whole. Finally, the social whole maintains an equilibrium in its environment, a unity in the midst of change, which might be termed its life. The church, the school, the factory, are not chance aggregates of men, but each realises a common life, each unifies the common religious, or intellectual, or economic activity of those whom its influence touches.

Sociology, in the broad sense of the term, is the science which deals with social phenomena; and it is in this sphere of social phenomena that the special features of human, in distinction from animal life, are to be found. On the basis of the above analysis, there will be no difficulty in stating the true relation between the sciences dealing with the individual mind (ethics and psychology as ordinarily treated) and the science of social phenomena. The individual mind does not exist until it is developed in society; society means little more than *herd* or *flock*, until it has a psychical life in the personalities of those who compose it. Mind and an environment that is mental are continuously determining each other, so that they are not to be separated except for the sake of analysis. Psychology is to deal with man in society; sociology deals with the psychical life

which arises when men enter into organic union ; the subject of the two sciences is the same, and the difference between them is simply a difference of standpoint.

## II

Various sciences already exist which deal more or less directly with certain classes of social phenomena, and any definition of the sphere of sociology is imperfect until it has determined the relation of sociology to these other sciences. Economics, politics and a series of so called comparative sciences, deal each with a particular class of social phenomena ; the student of history seeks to discover the relation of these different classes for one people and one age, and examines the development of a people from age to age. Sociology, defined as the science of social phenomena, includes all of these social sciences ; but in this general use of the term it is not a distinct science, but rather the name for a body of knowledge including several sciences. The more definite sphere of sociology as a science is indicated when we recognise that each of the sciences dealing with social phenomena involves a theory as to the nature of society, so that in order to proceed safely and correctly it must have a correct theory of society. One or two examples will make this plain.

In the case of economics, the theory of society on which it has sought to proceed has perhaps been unduly emphasised. This theory has gone so far as to abstract from all other human attributes, and to postulate as the economic man a being ruled by one desire—the desire for wealth. Out of such units it has put together its social structure, and then has attempted to outline a “mechanics” of this economic society. In such a society, combinations and separations, amity and hostility, are explained by one and the same principle, just as the formation of worlds and their present position in the heavens might be explained according to one principle by a “celestial mechanics.” Strange to say, the economic society thus outlined bore a remarkable resemblance to the industrial state of England during the early part of the last century, so that these prophets might claim honour in their own country, if not elsewhere. While this economic theory of society, like some other semi-mathematical abstractions, has served good purpose in isolating one class of phenomena and even making them subject to measurement, it is fortunate that economic science has not followed its theory too closely. The varied needs, interests, and habits of men have never been completely ignored, and they have commanded increasing recognition. The rise of newer economic schools, as they would call themselves, has made it evident that if

economics is to interpret industrial phenomena in any satisfactory manner, it must have some theory of society that is *broader* and *more concrete* than that which it has put forward in the past. The economic structure is really an abstraction from the general structure of society; a necessary and useful abstraction, but nevertheless it cannot be fully understood by itself. The economic group or organ is a social group or organ, with an economic end in view; and the principles of its existence and development can only be learned by a study of social organs in general. Economic progress is social progress viewed from one special standpoint; it should be studied as one phase of the evolution of society. In a word, sociology is more fundamental than economics and the other sciences which deal with special classes of social phenomena. Naturally, it has arisen later than these sciences which handle more concrete problems, but they in turn are to become dependent on the general principles which it deduces. The general principles governing the life of men in society are the basis on which economics will have to build its theory of the economic life of society.

The necessity of some theory as to the nature of society, and the importance of a correct theory, may be illustrated further by the example of linguistics. Until recent times, the study of language consisted in the collection of masses

of material from which it was difficult to make genuine deductions, because no true principle of arrangement existed. The effect of the idea of evolution, and the application of the comparative method, have wrought marvellous changes by introducing such a principle. Grammatical forms are studied now as an evolution, *i.e.*, later forms are descended from earlier. The lexicographer is no longer content with grouping the meanings of a word as may seem to him convenient. He desires to trace the "evolution" of different meanings from the simple meaning of a postulated or original root; here, again, evolution has meant nothing more than descent; the problem has been to trace words back to their "arboreal ancestor."

The history and theory of language are indissolubly connected with the history and the psychical capacity of man. Language is a social product, it is a function of all psychical activity, so that its changes and its evolution are but one side of the evolution of society. Accordingly, different theories of social evolution are reflected in different theories of the development of language. Spencer teaches that social growth is subject to a law of differentiation and integration; forms of social life tend to separate, and new organs are arising to perform special functions for the whole organism. In harmony with this theory, language should grow in definiteness

and in complexity, for it is but one phase of social activity. Such a theory of the development of language prevailed widely, earlier in the last century. Dr. Robinson in the preface to his translation of Gesenius's *Hebrew Lexicon*, described it as follows:—

“The historico-logical method of lexicography first investigates the primary and native significance of a word and then deduces from it in logical order the subordinate meanings and shades of sense, as found in the usages of different ages and writers, which, in short, presents a logical and historical view of each word in all its varieties of significance and construction.”

The same principle prevailed in Passow's *Greek Lexicon*, and to a degree in the lexicon of Liddell and Scott, which was based on this. [In fact, the preface to the first edition of Liddell and Scott blames Passow for paying too much attention to the context (especially in Homer) in determining the exact meaning of a word. Such a procedure is not “logico-historical”]. Another thinker [Gumplowicz, *Der Rassenkampf*] explains social growth by the antagonism and amalgamation of elements originally heterogeneous; one tribe reduces another to slavery; the new group is more complex, for the tribe that was stronger has risen by subjecting the other to its own ends.

Language would reflect such a process as this; its complexity would be due to the antagonism and amalgamation of different elements, while its extension and unification would represent the end rather than the beginning of its development. The new *Hebrew Lexicon* of Siegfried and Stade expressly repudiates the principles on which its predecessors for half a century had been constructed.

"On principle we have avoided setting up any so-called ground-meaning of words. For we are of the opinion that in a language the development of meanings does not proceed from a splitting up of a general and comprehensive idea, which special meanings, so to speak, represent the parts of the general conception, but rather that these special meanings arise by the transfer of a word with a special meaning to something else that is special, which appears similar to the former or is thought in connection with it. In our opinion the general meanings represent weakened (verblasste) special meanings. Especially do we consider those general meanings which, in the last decades, have decorated our Hebrew lexicons and commentaries as products of modern thought, or, if you will, as phantoms, which never corresponded with anything real. And purposely, too, have we avoided giving the history of the development of meanings of the



individual words through the various stages ; for we are too far removed from that time to make such an attempt successfully."

The history of language may be our most important key to the development of culture, and the growth of the social organism ; but language can never be understood except as a function of the growing organism. Each theory as to the development of society has its counterpart in the particular science of linguistics.

The relation of sociology to other sciences dealing with society, which I have attempted to illustrate by the case of economics and of linguistics, may be briefly outlined as follows. Social phenomena are various and complex. Without pressing the figure too far, we may say that society is a very complex organism in the course of development. No one observer, and no one method, will suffice for its study. One series of social sciences will deal each with a special class of social phenomena, noting their rise, development, and present character. Politics, for example, discusses the phenomena of the state, and comparative religion the religious phenomena ; each science will include both a historical and a critical discussion of its phenomena. These may be regarded as the first series of social sciences. Again different eras, "cross-sections" of this process of development may be studied by themselves, in order to learn the

relation of different classes of phenomena within such a section, and to trace in detail the causes of change from a preceding section. History, and more definitely the history of civilisation, is the inclusive name for the study of society in this second manner. Finally, special phases of this development, each of which touches various classes of phenomena, may be studied independently. The investigation of institutions such as the family and property hardly belongs to a science dealing with one class of social phenomena, for such an institution affects profoundly the structure of society itself, and all the different classes of phenomena which the first group of social sciences discuss.

In the broad use of the term, sociology may include all these various sciences which deal with social phenomena. But after this study of special classes of social phenomena, of sections and phases of this development, has been fairly begun, it becomes possible to study intelligently the general character and the general growth of the social "organism" as a whole. This latter study of general principles *logically* precedes the study of the social sciences, though *chronologically* it must follow them. It is my belief that such a "social biology" will work as profound changes in the social sciences, as the study of biology proper has wrought in the sciences dealing with plant and animal life.

This last analogy may serve to indicate with some distinctness the exact sphere of sociology, and the results which may be expected from such a study of society. Biology deals with the general phenomena of life, and the fundamental principles of life and growth ; it discusses also the evolution of new forms of life, and the laws governing this process. It may embrace all the biological sciences, but it refers in particular to the common basis of these sciences. In a similar way sociology may embrace all the sciences dealing with society, but it does not destroy the partial independence of any of these branches. It includes economics, politics, etc. ; but, instead of supplanting them, as Comte thought, its proper sphere is to lay the foundation for these particular social sciences. Defined from this standpoint, sociology will deal (1) with the general structure of society, its organs, and their functions ; and (2) with the laws governing social progress, or the evolution of new and more complex forms of social life.

The problems of social structure and of social activity will form the first part of the special science of sociology. Social statics and social dynamics cannot be separated after the fashion of the school of Comte, for all modern study of natural processes has tended to emphasise the interdependence of structure and function. The first question to which we desire an answer

is the question as to the nature of the object to be studied. What is a society? It has been called an organism, and a comparison with the animal organism brings out distinctly some facts as to the nature of the social group, which it might be difficult to grasp without the use of this figure. The society or social group has a physical life; it is in a physical environment and the physical fact of heredity gives the race a definite character. And yet as the word society or association indicates, we recognise that the true unity of a social group is not reached by a study of the physical side alone; it is a psychical fact, and as such it depends on man's delight in the companionship of his fellows, and on his power to join his fellows in common activity. The phrase "social mind" is a convenient one to denote the psychical life which is gradually developed in the group, and in which lies the true unity of the group. If then, the unity and character of a social group consists in a particular type of activity, the classification of social groups will depend on the classification of the social activities. To classify the modes of social activity and the stimuli or causes of each mode of activity, is a comparatively simple task; and from this standpoint we may classify also institutions, which are hardly more than habits of social activity, and the groups or organs which are

developed in the course of their activities. Some of these groups require further study. The science of economics discusses the industrial organisation of society. In particular, the family and the state are groups the study of which throws much light on the general structure of society, as well as on many problems which seem to open before society to-day. Finally, the student is in position to determine the meaning of the individual personality from the standpoint of sociology, and to understand the place of the individual in social life and growth.

The second great problem of sociology is the question of social evolution; and this includes both a general description of the development of society and of the processes at work in this development, and also a discussion of the causes and laws governing it. Viewed in a somewhat external way, the process of social evolution presents two general characteristics:—(a) the principle of continuity in the midst of change, and (b) what Spencer calls the law of progress, namely, that social elements at first separate but not different in kind, gradually lose their separateness and become essentially different in function and character. In the general course of evolution, analysis finds two processes, each of which has been put forward as a theory of development:—(a) the process of dispersion and differentiation, and (b) the

process of agglomeration and gradual unification of social groups into larger and more complex unities. Natural selection among varieties constantly appearing is said to be the law of biological evolution. This law is to be tested in the sphere of social evolution; the conflicting units must be determined, the effect of struggle on both conqueror and conquered examined, and the differences between the working of this law in the social and the biological sphere carefully noted.

### III

There still remains a question more fundamental than those that have been considered. Is it possible to pursue this study in a scientific manner, such that the result may fairly be called a science?

It may be granted to begin with, that scarcely any of the study which has been devoted to society as a whole, deserves to be called scientific. Ordinarily it has been a practical interest which has directed men's attention to this object, and the result of their study has been an embodiment of their desires and aspirations in the account of a No-man's land. And if the thinker felt metaphysically inclined, he has no doubt justified his picture by adding a deduction of it from his metaphysical principles. Much

of the worthlessness of these results has been due, I believe, to a confusion of the science of society with the philosophy of society. These words science and philosophy are used in such different senses that it is necessary for me to define my usage of them in order to make my meaning clear.

It is generally agreed that science deals with the facts given in experience—accurately describing them, classifying them, and deducing from them general principles or laws. Philosophy studies that which is not given in experience, but which experience presupposes; it studies what underlies experience, its so-called postulates, and the goals or ideals which ought to be realised in experience. Science is empirical and objective; it studies that which is. Philosophy has a more subjective and a nobler task; it seeks the meaning for man of that which is, it seeks the ends which man ought to make real in his world. On the basis of this definition everybody is a philosopher, while the scientific man is a late and rare development on our planet; the world received philosophical interpretation long before there was any dawn of science. And it is easy to see that the emancipation of science from the metaphysical method must have been a slow task. The physical sciences succeeded in asserting this freedom first, and only in our own day have psychology

and logic and ethics been able to secure any degree of freedom from metaphysics. The example of logic will serve to illustrate the distinction between philosophy and science which I am trying to make clear. Logic properly begins with a study of the phenomena of thought; it seeks its data from psychology, from the expression of thought in language, from the history of language, and from any other available source; these data it examines and classifies from its own standpoint, and seeks to find the laws which govern the acquisition of knowledge by the individual and the growth of knowledge for the race. This task is purely scientific, and speculation would only hinder its success. But the facts thus secured will serve as a basis on which a genuine philosophy of knowledge may be formed, a philosophy, which will at least be able to state the presuppositions of knowledge, and which can determine with some reasonableness the methods of *correct* thinking. Logic as science asks: what is thinking? On this basis, and not without it, logic as philosophy asks: What is true thinking? and, How can truth be reached? We have had enough of the social philosophy which consists in a system of short-sighted wishes. It remains to be seen whether there can be a true science of society, for (as in the case of logic) this is the only possible basis on which a philosophy of society



can have real value. Unless social phenomena are subject to law and can be studied by a rigid scientific method, any effort to control these phenomena by reason is absurd; they must be left to caprice and self-interest in the future as in the past.

The question as to the prevalence of natural law in human society is not at all a simple one, for various interests seem to be involved in it, and the discussion of it has been obscured in the past by great looseness in the use of terms. Students of social phenomena have regarded society now as a natural order, now as a normal order, so-called; and both the advocates and the opponents of the naturalistic view have confused the subject by discussing numerous questions under one and the same name.

The phrase "natural order," when applied to society, properly means the discussion of human society as part of the general order of nature; and except for the continued failure to recognise it, we should hardly think it necessary to add that "nature" is used in the larger sense of the word, and is by no means limited to physical, material, nature. When Aristotle discusses the different types of state as he finds them and attempts to trace the order of their development and the causes to which each is due; when Montesquieu finds in the "nature" of each people the explanation of its government

and of the character of its laws; or when historians generally, following the course marked out by Lessing, have sought to go beyond the mere transcript of events and to explain them by causes; it has been the constant presupposition that society is a part of the order of nature. Nor would the question seem complex except for the great variety of misconceptions to which it has given rise. I need only remind the reader of a few of these.

Earliest, and perhaps first in importance, was the conception of a *Jus naturale*, which at length was so deeply modified by the Stoic conception of life. In this connection natural law came to mean law that was universally binding, simple, reasonable—the remaining fragments of the “law” of the golden age. To this theory, which influenced so profoundly the later developments of Roman law, may be traced the use of the word *natural* as equivalent both to *primitive* and to *ideal*. This current of thought was at its height in the eighteenth century, and in the person of Rousseau. Thinkers placed their ideal in the past, and assigning it universal authority they sought to institute the golden age once more by the very simple method of retrogression. In this state of nature men were free, for no tyrants had as yet risen to oppress them; they were equal, for social differences had not yet had opportunities to

arise and corrupt the simple life. Even today "natural" law suggests an absolute order based on principles of reason (Maine, *Ancient Law*, p. 87). Although this order may not be projected into the past. It still suggests that there is one definite "best" type, to which society ought to conform. When the word natural is used to mean that society is a part of nature, and so an object of scientific study, it is still necessary to repudiate this old meaning that was once attached to it.

Nor should the word natural be understood as referring particularly to physical nature. The attention paid to physical science during the last century, and the wonderful results with which this study has been rewarded, have tended to crowd out the sciences dealing with man, or to reduce them to physical sciences. Science, in the minds of many, has come to be equivalent to physical science, natural law to physical law; to such, the study of society as a natural order seems to mean the explanation of society from physical forces, as, for example, climate, without reference to psychical facts. There is a justifiable treatment of social phenomena from the physical standpoint, but writers who, in so doing, would neglect the psychical side of social life in their study of the physical, are guilty of deserting higher truth for what would be a lower truth if it were not put where it becomes error.

It has been wisely remarked (Bernès, *Revue d'Economie Politique*, March, 1894) that when the scientific concept "nature" is extended to include social facts, the meaning of this concept is also extended. The facts of social life we know as it were from inside, so that they cannot be placed on the same plane as facts in the external world of sense. In treating society as a part of nature, and the laws of its activity as natural laws, I am far from endorsing the method of Quetelet and Buckle as the true way to study society.

Connected with this interpretation of natural law as physical law, is the belief that in a natural order the course of events is *determined* without reference to any activity of mind. The mechanism of physical nature is what it is, nor does it inevitably suggest the presence of intelligence or of will; so that a natural order of society is interpreted as a social order existing as it is, and independent of mind. It is assumed that fatalism is the outcome of naturalism, and in the social sciences this fatalism has been made the basis of a very emphatic *laissez faire*, for natural order has been interpreted as meaning an order that is both necessary, and the best attainable. Beyond question, a natural order is one that cannot be changed by mere wishes, or reversed by some new bit of legislation. The natural laws of society are simply the modes of activity necessary to attain ends, they are not

prescriptions of duty coming from a law-making power and changeable at the will of such a power. It is difficult to apply the words *good* and *bad* to the order of nature, nor is it *necessary* in the ordinary use of the word; it is necessary in that man cannot change it, good in that man can use it—the basis of social development, not the denial of all development. It is not fatalistic, for it is the basis required for intelligent activity, that by means of which a mind can accomplish its ends; it certainly is not an order such that human society must remain as it is, such that a reformer is an absurdity, and a new invention a crime. A fixed order and fixed unchanging laws in the world of physical nature are, though men have been slow enough to learn it, the very foundation of human intelligence. Perhaps the most potent factor in all human progress has been the patient, earnest investigation of these laws, which has made the forces of nature subservient to human ends. The only secure basis for social progress lies in the recognition of natural law in the social world; when such laws are sought out and discovered, then man can utilise them for his advancement. Natural laws, I repeat, do not assign duties, but they explain consequences—and the belief in a natural order is a belief that these consequences do follow the actions, in spite of any amount of wishing or legislating.

The fatalism which the phrase has suggested both to the opponents and the advocates of this belief, is an unjustifiable addition of an element that is wholly foreign to it.

I will mention but one other wrong meaning which the words "natural order" may suggest, *viz.*: It has often suggested a social mechanics based on pure self-interest, or on some other equally simple motive. The truth is that the easiest way to form a mechanics of society, is to take one simple and universal motive, and neglect all other motives to action. This course has often been pursued; and most systems of social mechanics are open to the charge of unfair abstractness and one-sidedness. Such a charge becomes really serious only when these systems claim to be something other than they are, only when their advocates forget that they are partial, and are suited only for the partial purpose with which they were formed. When they come to be regarded as true and complete statements of social phenomena, then they are evidently false; and the conclusions which are drawn from them when so regarded, run the risk of being very pernicious. The study of society as a part of nature does not mean that the facts of social life are to be sacrificed to a convenient abstraction.

By reason of the errors which have been associated with the phrases "natural law" and

"natural order," there has arisen a habit of finding the basis of society in a *moral* order as contrasted with a natural order (V. Cohn, *System der Nationalökonomie*, I, 356 sqq.) The phrase "moral order," when used to denote this contrast seems to me neither a clear nor a happy one. It has found its justification mainly as an attack on some of the erroneous views which had attached themselves to the conception of a natural order. For example, laying stress on the fact of progress, the advocates of this position have claimed that society could be made better in the future, as it has been made better in the past, even to the extent of a social revolution; and they have forgotten that in nature, too, there is progress—that we seem to find revolutions even in nature. Laying stress on the presence of mind as the very basis of social life, they have forgotten that mind also is a part of nature without which organic nature, at least, cannot be understood. They have said that civilisation means the conquest of nature, and progress the gradual subjection of nature to human ends; that the characteristic feature of human society is not its obedience to natural law, but the fact that nature has been overcome; that natural freedom is a contradiction in terms, for freedom depends on a moral order. In bringing to light the errors which have lurked behind the words "natural order," and in

emphasising the place of psychical life as the very essence of human society, the advocates of this view have done good service.

It is unnecessary to consider their position in greater detail, for I only wish to show that, as an antithesis to the idea of a natural order, the idea of society as a moral order is due to a misapprehension of what is meant by a natural order. Nothing has been brought forward by those who prefer the term moral, which is inconsistent with the "naturalistic" view when this is rightly understood.

I reach the conclusion that the objections to the study of society as a part of nature do not hold good, if "nature" is rightly understood. In so far as social phenomena are subject to natural law, science can use essentially the same methods in dealing with them as in dealing with physical phenomena. Very much the same result has been reached in the actual prosecution of the social sciences. History, politics, the study of institutions, have proceeded on the supposition that the phenomena studied by each, respectively, were subject to law, and the main work of these Sciences has been to discover the natural sequence of events under law in their different fields. At the same time, the presupposition has often been overlooked or denied, and it is part of the work of sociology to determine the exact place of natural law in the social sciences.



Science and philosophy unite in making the postulate that this is one world. At length, this seems to be the necessary basis of all careful thinking ; yet it is hardly possible to prove it, for even the proof of the conservation of energy, the proof that the world is one definite mechanical system, presupposes this postulate. Modern science starts from this postulate, and finds before it a single, somewhat distinct task, because this is one world, and the same law act in the same manner in all its parts. The modern belief in evolution has made this view much clearer, for it shows how we should conceive the relation between different objects and processes in the world. The world is studied as one process ; this study is science, and each single science is the study of some part of the world-process or the study of it from some particular standpoint. I see no reason to deny that society is a part of this order of nature, the crowning glory of the world-process, which has only been attained after ages of preparation. In society, natural forces are at work, and they are subject to natural law, although these forces and this law have risen to a higher plane of manifestation than the physical. The science of society, and the various sciences of social phenomena, are sciences because they study phases of the world as it is—or rather as it is developing. The position that society is a part

of nature, and so may be studied by means of scientific methods, is not one to be proved by deductive logic. It is simply the postulate on which alone social phenomena can be comprehended ; but, when rightly understood, I think that habit will be the only obstacle to its acceptance. On this basis, the forms of social activity, the social organs and their relation, and social development, can be studied in exactly the same manner as the functions and organs and development of the animal organism.

In bringing such a conception before the reader, we think it necessary to point out once more the fact that the social phenomena, which we should include in nature, are distinctly psychical in their character. The psychology of the schools has often failed to notice that mind and reason only pertain to the individual as a member of society, and that social life means nothing less than psychical life. Man's mind is connected in a wonderful way with his brain ; and, similarly, the psychical life of society has a physical basis in the race and its environment. In each case, the study of the physical is external and comparatively crude ; the essential nature of the phenomena is evident only when they are studied as psychical in their character. The determining feature of a social group is its psychical life, in a broad sense of the term, its civilisation ; the different modes of social

activity are so many forms of psychical activity; the development of society is the evolution of reason. The natural order which sociology studies is in the realm of psychical life.

When this position is thus understood, the main obstacle to its acceptance is the habit of holding a crude view of the freedom of the will. This is not the place to discuss such a vexed question, but perhaps I can indicate in three points the lines along which the student of society will justify himself in assuming that society is a part of nature, and that social phenomena, including the phenomena of volition, are subject to law. (1) Although this position is inconsistent with the common belief in indeterminism, *viz.*, the belief that the will is controlled by motives only in part, the student will point out that this common belief deserves to be called a popular theory rather than a practical belief, that it is at variance both with the carefully considered theories of the scientist and with the practical belief of all classes. A man may claim for himself the power to act with sovereign caprice, but even he seeks to influence his neighbours by rational motives, even he finds that there are laws applying to human action. (2) Further, the student will point out that the position he advocates is the very opposite of fatalism. He does not exclude mind from nature; he does

not assert that some outside power determines a man's life for him; the very object of his study is the manner in which a mind works out its ends in its environment. For him reason is the power to realise ends; society wins his interest and claims his study because social life is the activity of reason working itself out in nature. (3) He will follow recent defenders of this position (Riehl, *Der Philosophischer Kriticismus*, II. 2, § 216-280. Eng. trans., *Theory of Science and Metaphysics*, p. 206, sqq.) in pointing out that freedom from lower impulses, the power to feel noble impulses and to achieve noble results, the sense of responsibility and of duty, are all of them social phenomena which could not exist apart from society. He will claim that true practical freedom is inconsistent with the popular theory of freedom. Such, I believe, are some of the lines along which the student of society will attempt to show that while the phenomena of volition are subject to law, still this does not mean the destruction of responsibility and the overthrow of morals.

In advocating the study of social relations as they exist and as they arise, it is not my intention to cast any discredit either on the study of the ultimate principles which underlie human society, or on the study of the ends which may be realised in society. The science

of the evolution of society gives some clue to the next stage of social evolution, but it is hardly fair to call any such foreshadowed future state a social ideal. The science of society, in the narrow sense of the term which I have suggested, gives data by which I may pronounce the new form of society to be better or worse than those forms which have preceded ; but it contains no "ought," and in itself it lays no duties on any state or any church to bring in the future. The science studying facts and laws is, however, the source of our knowledge as to the results of action, so that it lies at the foundation of the individual's effort to discover true ideals and right rules of life in society. The study of the ends of which I ought to seek the realisation in society, is all-important, or dangerous nonsense, according as it has or has not a broad foundation and a true method. The confusion of maxims of social action with the scientific study of society, together with the use of the crude beginnings of social science as programmes for the renovation of society, has already cast great discredit on sociology. After the science of sociology has found solid basis in the study of social life as it is, the individual may depend on these results to guide his desires and his hopes. Rules of action and ideals which lack this foundation can have no permanent value. (*cf.* Wilson, "The Place of Social

Philosophy," *Journal of Social Science*, XXXII., Nov. 1894).

Just as the study of social ideals assumes its proper place on the basis of a careful science of society; so the meaning of social relations, and the ultimate explanation of that process of nature which science studies, can only be reached on the same basis. For example, the scientist studies conscience as it is and as it has arisen; he shows that it is a social fact, existing only in and through social relations, and coming into existence only through the intercourse of man with man, and of group with group; to introduce the question of its essential validity, or its ultimate source, would interfere with the successful prosecution of his task. The scientist takes the same attitude toward the fundamental truths of mathematics and of logic, toward ideals of the beautiful, toward religious beliefs. In each case the first question to be considered is the scientific question as to the facts themselves: the question; what are the phenomena, and in what manner did they come into existence; and the investigation of this question is only confused and hindered when purely philosophic considerations are introduced into the discussion. The separation of these two modes of investigation is as important for philosophy and religion as it is for science. The scientist may assert that the ideas of time and

space, norms of the beautiful, the conscience, are social products; the philosopher and the religious believer may answer, this is not only untrue but absurd. But unless the scientist has gone beyond his proper sphere, he only means that he finds in the study of social development a complete and satisfactory account of the manner in which these ideas arose; the philosopher and the believer are at liberty to interpret the meaning of these ideas as they find reason to. Let the two modes of investigation be kept separate and the results of each will be of greatest importance to the other.

This careful limitation of the task of sociology has been made necessary by the large claims made upon it, and by the misunderstandings to which it has given rise. If students of social relations are to be able to form true ideals of a better state of society, if they are to discover the real causes of abnormal social states, and if they are to be successful in modifying these causes for the better, then patient, critical, apparently unsympathetic investigation must first prepare the way. If the philosopher would penetrate the last secrets of the universe, and, reaching forward, would interpret the world in terms of a goal yet to be attained, he cannot afford to neglect any of the data which science can furnish. Science may seem to be sapping the root of religion when it tells the story of

creation and leaves out the Creator; and the "Scientific theist," the Christian evolutionist, and the Christian sociologist hasten forward to the rescue of God. But the reign of natural law suggests a nobler conception of God than the belief in a semi-divine chance; if evolution is the last word of science, it is a little more knowledge as to the way God works; if society is a part of the natural order God has established, the use of strict scientific method in its study is the way for the student of society to draw near to God. Modern science is non-philosophical in order that the scientist may be a true philosopher; it is non-religious, in order that the scientist may have a true religious faith.

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## CHAPTER I

### THE ORGANIC CHARACTER OF A SOCIETY

The first work of the student of sociology is to form a general conception of the nature of a society or social group, that object which he proposes to study. A considerable school of recent writers assert with confidence that a society is an organism. The figure is by no means a new one, for Plato and Aristotle made it familiar to their readers, and the writings of Paul and John have kept it before the Christian church. This statement of the nature of society has the advantage of simplicity; the analogy which it suggests is an exceedingly attractive one; moreover, it gives sociology a distinct place in connection with the other sciences, by bringing it into close relation with biology. Such an explanation of society apparently solves some difficulties which beset the earnest student, by showing that many a fact which in itself seemed an imperfection or a blemish, had a really important place in the development of society as a whole. And it seems to furnish some clues to the social ideals which reformers

of society may rightly aim to realise; at any rate, social reformers of antithetic schools profess to find support, each for his own position, in the doctrines of biological sociology.

Excellent as this analogy appears at first sight, the effort to construct a whole science on the basis of a mere analogy properly awakens suspicion. The so-called sociology which has been produced by this process in Germany, is hardly more than the description of social phenomena in biological language, and the interpretation of them in terms of biological laws. It is neither biology nor sociology, and it can serve no scientific purpose. Herbert Spencer does not develop this analogy so minutely as the German writers just referred to, and in his hands it affords a means of portraying vividly some of the essential features of social life and social development. However, it remains an analogy, and such an analogy always tempts the writer to exaggerate apparent likeness. Social tissue, and social organs, and the social mind, are convenient phrases; the question is whether they are true and the best expression for the truth.

In *Dr. Schäffle's* scheme, property is the passive factor, and the individual man the active factor, in the social substance. The family is the simplest vital unity or cell. The "Social substance" consists of (1) simple connective

tissue—unity of speech, belief, etc.; and (2) differentiated tissue—institutions for protection, industry, etc. Society has a mind, with sensitive and motive apparatus (*e.g.*, the executive function of the state), with intellectual activity (schools, etc.), as well as aesthetic and ethical life.

*Spencer* points out that animals have a three-fold system of organs; correspondingly, society has a nutritive system in its industrial organisation, rulers and defenders constitute its nervous system, transportation and exchange its circulatory system. Animals (*a*) increase in size, (*b*) increase in differentiation of structure and function, while (*c*) no part can live in separation from the developed organism. Societies (*a*) increase in size both by internal multiplication and by union of groups; (*b*) increasing differentiation is shown in the division of labour, and, as in the animal, the differentiated function gives rise to separate organs, and, finally, to a complex social apparatus; and (*c*) separation from the developed organism is fatal.

The question whether or not society is really a sort of biological organism is wont to receive undue emphasis to-day, by reason of the current discussion between adherents and opponents of a biological school of sociologists. The prior question, and, indeed, the only question of real importance, has to do with the truth which

this analogy is intended to convey. To the most superficial observer, society has some degree of unity, and it is made up of lesser units or groups. The general character of the larger unity is conveniently described by the word organic; and, in this opening chapter, I desire to unfold the meaning which should be associated with the word organic as applied to society. The analogy between society and an organism suggests (1) the general character of the social unit, and (2) the relation of social units to each other and to their natural environment.

## I

As applied to a social group, the word "organic" means first that a society shows the same marvellous subjection of a complex structure to a single end that characterises a plant or animal. The animal organism consists of cellular material which biology regards as one and the same in all its modifications, but this material assumes very different forms in the various parts and organs of the body. While each organ regarded by itself has a certain unity and independence, it is immediately connected with others in the same system or apparatus, and less closely with other parts of the same whole. The stomach has its own function, but

this function is subordinated to the end or function of the whole digestive system, and this again is indissolubly associated with the functions of the other systems in the body. The further analysis is carried, the more complex the structure of an organism appears, and at the same time the unity of the whole stands out so much the more distinctly. In general structure, there is not simply an analogy between the social group and the animal organism; the complexity in which the unity finds expression is the same in both. A society consists of individuals who are essentially alike, although they become very different as they stand in different relations to the life of the whole. These individuals live their life in groups—social, industrial, and political, each little group has some independence, but it is immediately connected with other groups in the same (industrial, or political, or intellectual) system, and this system, again is co-ordinated with others in the complex life of society. In spite of the fact that the individual units seem so simple and familiar, it is quite impossible to cover in any analysis all the complex life in which each bears its part; but the fact that the common life has a unity of its own becomes more clear the more it is studied.

For instance, common political life, the unity of a nation, is not fully comprehended in the

few powers that may be directly exercised by the central government. Each dependent commonwealth, country, and town represents to those whom it includes certain phases of the sovereignty of the whole. The energy and harmony of the state depend on the true vigour and vitality of each part and of each citizen. At the same time, the political organisation of society stands in closest relation with its social, industrial, and intellectual structure. A state is not constituted by the presence of military power, nor yet can industry flourish and intellectual culture arise without the presence of some authority able to maintain order and to protect from attack.

Secondly, in its application to the unity of a social group, the word "organic" reminds the student that a society has not so much a structural unity as the unity of a process. In the biological organism, be it vegetable or animal, the cells are constantly changing, and the structure is permanent only in its general outlines. Each part spends itself in performing its function for the whole, and is constantly restored through the natural activity of the other parts in the performance of their own functions. The animal is one because the different organs are so delicately adjusted to each other that they work together as parts of one process, which process is the animal's life. It is equally true

of society that its structure is constantly changing, and that its real unity consists of the common life in which all the social activities bear a part. In every society the units are constantly changing, young men come forward to take the place of the old. The institutions for accomplishing given ends change from age to age, and the general structure of society is always being slowly modified. For example, economic goods may be produced by the tribe, by the village, in the family, or in the factory; in these different cases the structure of a society is profoundly different. The life and vigour of society depend upon change, but through all change a society preserves its real unity because its common life continues. Each social organ is spending itself in performing its function for the whole, and its energy is constantly restored as its members receive food and clothing, new satisfaction, and new incentive of every sort, because the other social organs are performing their proper functions. The larger society is one when all its parts depend on each other in one common life-process. The smaller social group, *e.g.*, a trades-union is one, not by reason of the particular organisation it may form, but because its members share a common life.

The important corollary to the truth just stated, is that the different parts and activities of society stand in very close relations of

interdependence. This interdependence often seems greater than in the case of animals, where the loss of a foot or an eye may have no direct effect on the stomach, and even a part of the brain may be destroyed without any perceptible change in the other organs. The most familiar example of social interdependence is the economic life of society, with its balance of supply and demand, delicately adjusted and yet inexorable, controlling all the markets of the world and making the industrial world one. Injury to an economic class is immediately felt through all the economic world; and it has far-reaching results in the spheres of social, moral, and intellectual life. A new invention in America may cheapen the food-supply of Europe, or affect the percentage of crime in England. Similarly the health of a city is threatened by a single case of contagious disease, and a single crime widely advertised often produces a harvest of moral evil. It is claimed that the multiplication of Homes for the Fallen in some parts of England has actually gone so far as to make vice easier and less repellent. Such a familiar fact as the dynamic interdependence of the different parts of society hardly needs illustration. The use of the word "organic" in application to a society as the expression of this fact, is justified both because the organism is the most familiar example of this kind of interdependence,



and because no analysis can adequately express all the complex relations which exist in the developed society.

The most striking difference between an organism, plant or animal, and any other object, is that the unity and the growth of an organism seem to be determined from within. (*Cf.* Mackenzie, Introduction to Social Philosophy, Chap. III). The unity of a hill or a rock depends on our own definition; the unity of a house rests back on the idea in the mind of the builder; but a plant includes so much as is subject to the single life-principle within. The word "organic" as applied to a society means, thirdly, that any given society includes so much as is subject to the life of that society. The unity of a people is not determined by life in the same geographical locality; the Englishman and the Spaniard are to be found in all parts of the globe. Nor does it depend necessarily on the unity of political life; United Germany is a recent fact, while political union hardly succeeds in uniting Norway and Sweden. The unity of a people is the unity of a common life. The same language, the same customs and traditions, a love for the same past, these are important factors in a common life, although they do not express it all. A people is truly one only when it has come to recognise its unity, to be proud of custom and tradition

because these express its own past, to be loyal to the institutions of the present because these are the form of its present life. A people is one when it has developed a self-consciousness of its own ; such a unity determined from within is fitly called "organic."

Moreover, the growth of a plant, or an animal, is governed by an internal law. The word growth is not directly applied to increasing geological formation or to mechanical products; the factory extends as machinery is added and the old engines replaced by new, but it does not itself grow. The organism proper unfolds from within, in accordance with a type already determined in the germ, and growth is the development of this type, or character, when the germ is placed under favourable conditions. The clearest law of history is that a human society follows the same law of growth from within. Every age and every period of development sets the type for the succeeding period, determining its general character, if not the extent and rapidity of development. A church grows, not when it is extended over new territory, but when it absorbs and controls new peoples, by subjecting them to the power of its life; its growth is from within. The modern type of factory production may be traced from the inventions which made it possible, through various stages, to its present form, and it still has a future

before it. All the economic and legal and political institutions that we prize, are parts of a process of growth, their authority is the outgrowth of the past, and their future form develops out of the present. One nation may conquer another in battle, but it remains to be seen whether the conquering people has, in itself, the genius to absorb the other people into its own life. Crises come in the life of every nation, when some great political change seems to be suddenly introduced, yet it is hardly necessary to look beneath the surface to see that the new external order is simply the truer expression of the common life which gradually has come to demand the new form. The bud has been slowly developing as it absorbed the plant-juices, and some morning the flower is open. The growth of a nation is determined from within; in the life of a people is to be found the law of its development.

## II

The second thought suggested by the word organism is that a society is not an independent entity, but develops as part of a larger process. The plant, or animal, is related to others which are included in the same species; it is related, less closely but none the less really, to other organisms in the great whole of organic nature;

it depends most intimately on its physical environment: in these different ways it takes its place in that one great process which we call Nature—or the World.

A society depends on its environment no less intimately than do the organisms of biology. Physical environment does much to influence the character of a society by its influence on the persons who compose it; more directly still, physical environment affects society itself, determining the lines which social activity may follow, and stimulating or checking that activity. The broken coast of the Mediterranean brought very different peoples into comparatively close contact, and the resulting development of industry spread a democratic spirit in communities on the coast. Aryan tribes penetrating into Greece were necessarily broken into smaller groups, and the lack of communication between narrow valleys made the culture of one group less and less like that of the others. Where food is sparse, and widely scattered, as in Australia, only four or five or six persons can find maintenance together, and the size of the social group is immediately determined. In times and places of plenty the tribe increases with abnormal rapidity till emigration is, perhaps, necessary to provide food for all. In all phases of its activity a society is linked most closely with physical nature outside itself, and

the same analysis which often makes it convenient to speak of an organism and its environment, has constantly led the student to speak of the environment—the physical environment—of society.

If any given society is isolated and set in contrast with its environment, the most important phase of this environment is its social side, the environment by human societies with which the given society stands in connection. The military strength of a society is determined by its social environment. In Modern Europe enormous sums are spent that each nation may keep its relative place among its neighbours in reference to armament on land and sea. In all but the lowest stages of uncivilised life the same principle holds good, a tribe maintains its place among its neighbours by its fighting powers, its numbers, or its strength of position, among weaker neighbours it may be split by dissension, or lose its vigour without running the risk of annihilation. The tools, and much of the skill in meeting wants and desires, which a tribe possesses, are determined by social environment. The bow and arrow have a given area, the boomerang a more limited area; among tribes which use the one weapon a new tribe would adopt that, unless it brought with it a superior weapon which the other tribes might adopt. Customs have the same history. Forms

of Government, religious practices, rules of right action, and even the minutest details of custom in the simplest matters, are determined for the social group in large measure by its social surroundings. In all its social life a society is connected with all the adjacent societies, and with the development of civilisation this connection is extended indefinitely.

Secondly, the word "organic" suggests that the larger process to which each society belongs, may be described as an evolution. In the animal and vegetable kingdoms the word "evolution" means that organisms may be arranged in a series which represents, more or less perfectly, the history of their development. The series converges as one goes backward, till hypothetically some simple form is reached, to which all the complex forms of life are traced back. In the earlier part of the series, there are presumably some well-marked stages, while in the latter part there could hardly be stages of development which would be identical for forms so diverse as birds, fishes, and mammals. And the word "evolution" means that we have reason to believe that this series really represents what we know of the history of organic life. The reason for believing that life has followed such a course of development, is that we find it still subject to the same laws and following the same course. These biological laws may,

in part, be determined as a matter of experiment, so that the student can actually see the process of evolution going on.

In like manner the complex forms of human societies now existing, may be traced to simple antecedents, and arranged in a series. The complex judicial and legal institutions of modern society are said to begin with a few simple rules by which a dispute is to be settled. Different forms of industrial organisation, from the barter of lowest savages down to the industrial life that now involves in one current all the civilised nations of the globe, may be arranged in a series representing the industrial evolution of society. It has often been assumed that such a series represents what we know of the history of the human race from some one simple beginning down to its present complex life. In any case it is a simple matter to point out some stages in the early history of a given division of the race, stages which, perhaps, arose independently in different places as the outcome of the same causes. Thus we speak of a stone age, and a bronze and iron age; of a hunting age, and a nomad age, and an age of agriculture. But here, as before, the real reason for believing that human society developed under definite laws from some simple beginnings, is that it is possible to trace the process for a little way and to determine some of these laws. Within the

period covered by historic records, we see each present growing out of its past, we discover some of the causes for each change in the form of social life, the general trend of the development becomes clear, and at least a few of the laws to which this social process is subject, may be determined. Any particular phase of social life can only be understood as part of the one great process of social development, and the larger process is best understood as an evolution of many complex forms out of a very few simple forms.

That so striking an analogy as the analogy between a society and an organism should lead to false conclusions, is by no means surprising. "A society is either organic or inorganic," is Spencer's dilemma (Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Part II, Chapter II); and as the society is quite unlike inorganic matter, he concludes that it is not only organic but is itself an organism, and that it differs from the animal only as the animal differs from the plant. "Organisms grow; societies grow: therefore society is an organism." The argument of the biological school of sociologists can be reduced to this simple form, and the fallacy which is evident in this statement, is not avoided by the rich and varied forms in which the argument is often presented.

The analogy between a society and a biological organism is far from perfect, so that the actual



help which sociology can derive from biology is little enough. No mere expansion of an analogy, even if it be expanded through several volumes, deserves the name of a science; moreover, this particular analogy has hindered the progress of sociology by the false and one-sided views which it has suggested. And yet, in spite of all that may be urged against it, the analogy continues to have real value as a very effective way of stating important truths. The complex unity of the social structure can never be fully stated in any analysis, however far it be carried. The dynamic interdependence of the different social elements in one great process is like the interdependence of functions in the life of an animal, in the fact that it is never fully described in the abstract propositions of science. In a word, the general nature of a social unit and the character of its dependence on other units, are best described by the use of this figure. And as the student goes on to study the social group from different standpoints, to classify and examine the different forms of social activity, and to seek the laws of social development, the "organic" character of a society is constantly to be kept in mind.

The word "organic" is used to describe :—

I. The Unity of a Society.

- (1) Remarkable complexity of the single structure.

- (2) The real unity lies not in the structure, but in the one process in which all the parts depend intimately on each other.
- (3) The unity and the development of a society are determined from within.

II. The fact that each social element is part of a larger process.

- (1) Each society depends on its environment, both physical and social.
- (2) Each social element and social function is understood only as part of a larger process, *viz.*, the evolution of human society.

#### NOTE ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN A SOCIETY AND A BIOLOGICAL ORGANISM

The discussion of "Biological Sociology" does not fall within the scope of the present work, but it may be useful to summarise briefly the important differences between a society and an organism.

- (1) The original elements of society are *more discrete* than the original elements in a biological organism. The higher this organism, the more closely all the parts are bound together in subordination to the single life of the whole. As a society develops a higher and more intense life, the persons composing it acquire more and more individuality. In consequence of this

(a) parts of a society can live alone when separated; a Robinson Crusoe on a "desert island" is possible when nature is reasonably lavish; and (b) the loss of a considerable part is less dangerous to the whole.

(2) The form of the social group is *less fixed and permanent* than is the structure of an animal or plant. The organs of an animal belong to a few definite series, and their functions remain about the same. In a society, the number and variety of social "organs" goes on increasing indefinitely; and their particular structure and function do not continue the same. Consequently (a) social growth is less closely limited by time and space than is the growth of an organism proper. Unlike the life of an animal, the life of a society tends normally to become more stable, its power to adapt itself to changed conditions increases, and much as the form of its expression may change, it is in reality continuous. And (b) changes in the life of a society may be more various, more important, and more rapid than in the animal or plant. An economic crisis changes in a few days the whole face of the industrial world, an election changes the *personnel* of a government, and perhaps reverses its policy.

(3) In the social organism, the *interdependence* of the original elements and their aggregates becomes even closer than in the biological

organism. Really, the limited independence of each part or organ in the animal is quite as remarkable as its dependence. In society, the industrial activity, for instance, responds at once to the least change in any of the factors that enter into it, and all the other forms of social activity are affected with that which is properly industrial. The interdependence of social functions and social groups is so great as to transform the whole process of evolution. There is a survival of the fittest man in the tribe, but each member is cared for by the tribe. The fittest tribe survives, but each tribe speedily adopts from its opponents their superior weapons and even their superior organisation. The result of the extreme sensitiveness of each element in society to the state of each other element, is to overbalance any lack of union which might result from the more flexible and variable character of social units, and even to utilise that flexibility in behalf of a more intimate common life.

(4) The differences so far considered have been only relative. but the final distinction is qualitative and essential. In the animal, consciousness is an attribute of the whole organism. In a society, consciousness remains centered in the discrete individual elements, when men's thoughts come to move in the same channel, and a group learns its own unity, we speak of a

"social consciousness"; but the phrase never means that a society has a brain or a consciousness apart from the consciousness of the men who compose it. The present difference becomes even more marked in the process of development, for the animal development has meant a concentration of the more important nervous elements, and a merging of their separate activity into the common activity of a single consciousness. In the lower stages of society bodies of men are more easily swayed by a single common thought or emotion—as when the mob first worshipped Paul and Barnabas as gods, and then drove them from the city. The development of society involves the development of individuality in each of its members, in as much as the growth of a larger common life is the condition of a truer and deeper self-consciousness. The history of industry is the history of increasing industrial liberty and increasing responsibility for the individual. The strong government rests on the sense of citizenship it has developed in the governed. In a word, the development of society is a development of persons; the "social consciousness" only exists in the discrete social elements which have become individual.

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## CHAPTER II

### THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF SOCIETY: RACE AND LOCALITY

Society has been called the third stage of the aggregation of matter. Such language is scarcely necessary to bring out clearly the fact that the life of society, like all other life, has a physical basis. Modern physiology attempts to show that all the phenomena of life, the sensitive or psychical as well as the purely vegetative, are simply new transformations and combinations of physical energy. (Eg., Huxley, Lay Sermons, Essay vii.; Claude Bernard, *Leçons sur les phénomènes de la vie*, p. 22, sqq.). There is no peculiar life-force, nor is there any part or function of the animal that is regarded as beyond the reach of the physical sciences. All the energy received by the animal is appropriated from its physical environment, and returns when expended to the fixed fund of energy in the world. If science is ever to understand life completely, it will simply be the complete statement of the transformations of energy which make up the life-process.

Similarly, if there is to be a physical science of society, it will be necessary to show that all the distinctively social phenomena have a physical basis, and can be stated in terms of physical science as transformations of physical energy. Physical science admits no peculiar social force, and it does not hesitate to offer its explanation of energy and activity as it appears in the social world. This energy depends immediately on the capacity of the individuals of which the society is composed. Its character and amount is determined primarily by the individuals, secondly, by the power of union between these individuals, and thirdly, by the environment in which they are placed. This energy, too, is appropriated from the physical universe, and is returned to this when expended. No part or function of social life lacks this physical basis, the study of which is the proper sphere of physical science. The truth of this study of society from the physical standpoint may be admitted without at all overlooking the fact that this is not the whole story, even if it does cover the whole ground. Other lines of approach may yield new truth and shed new light on the matter, beyond what is accessible by the methods of pure physical science. (In the study of society, it is important to guard against the notion that physical life and psychical life have no relation to each other. The

same facts in nature may be studied from the standpoint of physical science and by its method ; and they may be studied from the standpoint of psychology and history and by the methods of these sciences. A clear statement of the critical view of the relation between physical and psychical phenomena may be found in Riehl, *Philosophischer Kriticismns*, II, 2, pp. 176, sqq., Eng. tr., *Science and Metaphysics*, pp. 167, sqq.).

From the physical standpoint men may be grouped according to race or according to locality. Physically, the life and growth of society is to be explained in terms of these two factors. A race is a "Social Organism" or a part in some such organism ; the locality is the physical environment in which this so-called organism develops. The two stand in reciprocal relation, just as the eye is related to light or the stomach to food. This relationship is so complex that it is ordinarily impossible to trace particular effects to particular causes. The discussion in regard to such a relatively simple matter as race-colour, illustrates this. In general the darkest races are found in regions rather low and not far from the equator. Very wild guesses have been hazarded to account for the dark colour ; perhaps a fair sample of these is the theory that it is due to an excess of carbon in the system, and that this is caused by



the quality of the air ! Science is limited to the general statement, and can only prove that climate has a slight tendency to modify colour. (Waitz, *Anthropologie*, I., p. 38, sqq.)

“Inorganic nature, even the lowest and the least complex, is the matrix where are fertilised and developed the germs of all social forms and organisms, which.....gradually rise.....and develop out of the fatality of the physical medium from which they came” (de Greef, *Introduction à la Sociologie*, I, p. 50). Progress in civilisation involves an increasing knowledge of the laws of nature and of the means of utilising natural forces. Among the lowest races man's life seems to be an almost passive element, moulded by the natural forces of its environment. Mountains and seas are impassable; drought means famine, disease means death; no real resistance to the powers of nature is possible. Civilisation does not change natural laws, but it enables man to use these laws. Man reacts to the influences of his environment with the power that has been developed in society. The sea becomes his highway and mountains are tunnelled. Disease is grappled with, the means of sustaining life become more various and are more carefully husbanded, so that the average length of life has been constantly and materially lengthened. These effects of climate, food, etc., are the more difficult to

study because they are never simple but are modified by the constantly changing nature of man. Man cannot rise above his environment, but he does rise by using the forces which at first had blocked his progress.

The factors of the physical environment of society may naturally be discussed under three heads :—(1) the effect of the contour of the earth's surface, (2) the effect of climate, and (3) the effect of the things directly utilised by man, both inorganic and organic. Under the first heading, there fall influences which affect a social group as a whole; under the second and third, influences which directly affect individuals, and through them modify the character of the societies which they constitute.

Two eminent geologists, B. v. Cotta and Tittel, have explained the most striking difference between the French and the German peoples as the result of the contour of their respective lands. Paris is almost in the centre of a large basin including more than half of France; by nature it is the political centre and the economic centre of all that region. The North German plain is the only considerable geological district in Germany and each of the small districts has developed its own peculiar customs and industries, in fact its own culture. It is impossible that the common life of the people, or its national life, should be so centralised

as in France. (Honegger, *Allgemeine Kulturgeschichte*, I. S. 182.) The attempt to explain a people by its land is almost sure to end in gross exaggeration, but this is due to a tendency of human nature, not to any weakness of the method.

The physical configuration of the surface is an important factor in determining the size of the social group. Rich valleys separated by high ridges are the homes of small groups very distinct from their neighbours. Among uncivilised races, rivers united more closely the tribes living on their banks, and mountain ranges proved an effectual barrier to intercourse of any sort. In all history these influences have had much the same effect. Greece was a country for small states, aside from the character of its people; the plains of the Nile and of the Euphrates were countries that favoured the development of a common life. Apart from the ease with which man's wants were supplied in the rich river basins of warm countries, the physical fact of a considerable area sheltered from outside interference and easily traversed by water or by land, rendered such basins the natural seats of early despotic civilisations.

Further, the physical configuration determines in large measure the isolation of the social group. Traces of the oldest civilisation in Europe are found in deep valleys of the Alps,

which are so effectually separated that the people in one valley cannot easily understand the language of those in the next valley, and have an entirely different moral standard. (Marshall, *Principles of Economics*, I, p. 231). Bohemia is so surrounded by mountain ranges that the culture of its people has been effectually isolated; the Czechs are surrounded on every side by Germans, but their unity and national life have not been materially affected even by political union with a German people. As examples of the other side of this fact, the geographical position of Greece and its opportunities for contact with other peoples, were a necessary condition of the development of Greek civilisation. It is said that every capital city in Europe is a port with direct access to the sea. Rome's power is not explained by referring to seven hills on the bank of a river, not far from its mouth, but it is evident enough that the rise and extension of this power depended largely on the natural facilities for intercourse with other nations.

Finally, the contour of the surface determines the lines of social movement. Physical forces always follow the lines of least resistance. This is true alike of the projectile's regular curve and the lightning's jagged path. The primitive horde gradually forms beaten paths about its abode. These paths and in fact all intercourse

with other peoples, are determined by the easiest courses, and necessarily avoid all obstacles. Civilisation and culture follow these same lines, for they can only go when social and economic intercourse have preceded. Caravans still traverse the natural courses from Egypt into Palestine, and from Babylonia up to Syria. These ancient avenues of civilisation, and even the direction which civilisation should take, were determined by the contour of the earth's surface. War and conquest have always followed lines marked out for them beforehand. Ancient and modern migration has been similarly directed. Sometimes the course of an ancient horde overrunning a part of Europe, can be followed in detail, and each deviation from a straight course is explained by natural obstacles, or by the physical strength of those already in possession of the soil (Humboldt, quoted by Honegger, *Kulturgeschichte*, I. S. 184). To-day emigration is from some crowded quarter, along the lines of least resistance, to the spot which seems to offer opportunity for an easier and richer life. Every re-distribution of the parts of society has its physical side, and, like any re-distribution of matter it follows the lines of least resistance. "The final and highest truths of the geographical sciences are included in the statement that the structure of the earth's surface, and the differences of climate dependent

upon it, visibly rule the course of development for our race, and have determined the path for the changes of the seats of culture, so that a glance at the earth's surface permits us to see the course of human history as determined (or, one may say, purposed) from the beginning, in the distribution of land and water, of plains and heights" (Peschel, *Geschichte der Erdkunde*, S. XV).

The second group of external influences affecting the development of a race are denoted by the word climate; and first among these climatic influences I would mention light. The length of day may vary but slightly the year through, or the whole summer may be a day and all the winter a night. This, of course, affects social life, and by itself makes the polar regions very unfavourable to the development of culture. Again, the absence of light from a tropical forest, as well as the absence of protection from the rays of the sun on desert sands, can but affect the life of the individual and the habits of the tribe.—A second climatic factor is temperature: its absolute height, its range of variations, and the rapidity of its variations. The average height of temperature has a two-fold effect; direct, in that life requires far more to sustain it in colder regions, and indirect, in that this nourishment is far more difficult to obtain in such regions. It requires comparatively little

to sustain life in the Sandwich Islands, for instance, and the necessary fish and bananas cost but little effort. The general effect of a decidedly low temperature on man or animals, is to decrease the stature perceptibly, and to check rapidity of development, both physical and psychical. Among the Esquimaux, as among those Peruvians who dwell at a great height above the sea, the average stature is decidedly below the normal. Near the equator children are even more precocious than in the temperate zone, and it is in warm countries, *e.g.*, in Mexico, that the ratio of births to the population is greatest. (Waitz, *Anthropologie*, I. S. 43, sqq. Hensinger, *Grundzüge d. vgl. Physiologie*, S. 211, sqq.) The influences affect society directly as well as through the individual. In the regions of extreme cold, co-operation is necessary in order to obtain livelihood, while at least the effort to secure subsistence absorbs all the energy that is developed, so that there is no opportunity for progress. Near the equator the high temperature does not favour the habit of work (Waitz, I. 395, sqq.); uniformity of temperature tends to make monotonous lives (Crawford, quoted by Honegger, I. S. 188), and with every want supplied, man is not obliged to co-operate with his fellows. The temperate zone, with moderate climate and considerable changes of temperature, proves most favourable for the development of

man and of society. Such a climate makes many demands on men and permits the development of the greatest energy to meet these demands. Here the individual may attain his highest development, but his progress is conditioned at every step by dependence on an advanced type of society (Cohn, *System der Nationalökonomie*, I. S. 218. A. 1). A third climatic factor is the composition of air, and in particular the amount of moisture it contains. A Greek proverb connects sluggishness and mental indifference with those who lived among the marshes of Boetia. Much of the African coast means disease and death to foreigners who are not accustomed to its malarial breezes. Rarity of the air, as well as its moisture, affects the throat and lungs; and doubtless this is one reason for the fact so often asserted, that mountain races possess more vigour than races that inhabit low, damp plains. Perhaps, however, the most important effect of moisture in the air is indirect, and is due to its influence on vegetation.

Thirdly, the character of society is modified by its locality, because the forms of matter and of life, which are directly utilised by men, vary so much in different parts of the earth. Animal and vegetable life depend immediately on the presence of water. Man may have reason to worship water as the principle of life, as in Greece or ancient Babylonia; or to regard it as the principle



which hinders creation, when it suggests to him impassable forests or marshes. In any case, life and civilisation depend upon its presence in suitable amount. Again, the distribution of minerals, especially the metals, has had a very important influence on the development of society. The discovery of the metals and of methods of utilising them, had such far-reaching effects that the phrase "iron age" or "bronze age" is still used to denote the new stage of culture which was introduced by the discovery and general use of the metals. The presence of a clay suitable for pottery is more common, but none the less important. To-day, the existence of mineral wealth and of coal determines the industry of a country. Still the direct influence of what the soil contains is far less than its indirect influence: the flora and the fauna of a district depend upon its soil (Marshall, Principles of Economics, I, p. 329).

Logically, the effect of vegetation would be considered before the effect of the fauna of a region, but as a matter of history, animal life has become a potent factor in civilisation long before vegetable life. Doubtless, roots, nuts, and in certain instances fruits, were the earliest food of man, but the lowest civilisations with which we are familiar have weapons of the chase as perhaps the only implements of civilisation. A hunting people exists when there is game, and

approximately in such numbers as the game of a given region will support. The domestication of animals is really the beginning of progress, and the first step in progress is always the most important. The constantly recurring want of a hunting people was relieved when a regular supply of milk was at hand, together with flesh when that was desired. A far larger number of individuals could be supported in the same region, when the animals that furnished food were regularly bred and pastured by man. A broader and more permanent social life was made possible when the food supply was a bond of union instead of a centrifugal force, and when property in herds required union for its defence. The absence of animals suitable for domestication on the American Continent is one reason for the low state of civilisation indigenous there.

The vegetation of a country, real and possible, determines the form of industrial life; and industrial life is at the basis of society. The steppes of Asia naturally furnish food for flocks, and a nomadic people occupy them. Rich plains in the river valleys are utilised for agriculture. The discovery of the cereals suitable for food was hardly less important than the discovery of the domesticable animals; and it marked an immense advance beyond the latter discovery, because it encouraged a settled life, and removed man still farther from subjection to the vicissitudes of

nature. The same area devoted to agriculture will support a population many times greater than when it is devoted to grazing purposes. Moreover, agriculture not only encourages a settled life, but it almost demands a stable social organisation. Cereal food is really the basis of civilisation. The effect of the soil, as the most important factor in the industrial environment, is no less to-day than in the past. However we may interpret the so-called Law of Diminishing Returns, there is no question that a definite density of population is most favourable for utilising the products of the soil, and that when the population rises above or falls below this degree of density, evil consequences ensue. (Marshall, *Economics*, I, pp. 191, 505.) The movements of population also, both from old to new countries, and from the country to the city, are determined primarily by the opportunities for cultivating new soils, and by the fact that barren soils are thereby thrown out of cultivation.

Environment alone is but one factor in the physical life of society ; it is equally necessary to study the correlative factor, the race that lives in this environment. In the first place the facts of race persistence and race expansion demand attention. The so-called doctrine of population is an attempt to state these facts. Speaking roughly, we may say that the growth

of population is determined by the food-supply. As Malthus pointed out, plants as well as animals, tend to reproduce themselves and multiply with extreme rapidity; but the land available for wheat culture is limited, and only a limited number of animals can find food, accordingly the available food supply for man has only a limited increase from year to year. But man, as well as any other animal, tends to multiply far more rapidly than the food supply would warrant, and unless this growth is checked in other ways, misery and famine will prove a most effective check. There are a few races which seem to have become unprolific so that they are actually dying out. Apart from these exceptional cases, every race known to us has the capacity of multiplying much faster than the food-supply increases; and as a matter of fact, the net increase is frequently far in advance of the increase in food-supply of a given region. Malthus claimed that the natural positive checks formerly effective—war, famine, infanticide, etc.—were becoming less and less operative, and that if society did not voluntarily limit the number added to it, misery would constantly increase, and the race would degenerate instead of making progress.

To-day Europe has a considerably larger population than its lands will support, as they are at present cultivated, and the present net

increase of two and a half millions a year cannot continue indefinitely to find support from other sources. The more careful study of statistics in recent years seems to show that Malthus's discussion of "natural," "positive" checks, was imperfect, and that, as a matter of fact, the net increase in population follows quite accurately the increased means of subsistence. According to figures quoted by Professor Marshall, from the *Statistical Journal* for 1885, the net increase per thousand is, in general, quite independent of the number of births per thousand. A few figures selected from these tables, are sufficient to show the drift of the whole.

		Russia	Hungary	Saxony	Bavaria	Italy	England
Births	...	49.4	43.	42.4	39.5	36.8	35.1
Deaths	...	35.7	38.2	29.	30.6	29.1	21.4
Net Increase	...	13.7	4.8	13.4	8.9	7.7	13.7

		Sweden	France
Births	...	30.2	25.4
Deaths	...	18.9	23.8
Net Increase	...	11.3	1.6

Apart from the exceptional case of France, these figures seem to show : (1) that the birth-rate of each people is more than sufficient to produce the number who can find subsistence under the conditions now actually existing; (2) that the death-rate rapidly increases with the larger birth-rate, so that the net increase corresponds closely to the increased means of sustaining

human life; (3) that, in general, the larger increase in population does not correspond with an increase in misery and degradation. It is only in Russia that the rapid increase has proved to be a source of danger, and perhaps of decline. [A. Dumont, *Dépopulation et civilisation*, Paris, 1890, gives an interesting discussion of the special case of France, as well as farther statistics with reference to the general problem. The main value of the work lies in its careful analysis of local statistics in France.]

There can be no question that these facts, proved by statistics for modern Europe, are, in the main, true of primitive society. There has always been the same lavish supply of human life, the same pressure of population upon food-supply, leading to rapid expansion with every new source of food; and though we may not be able to explain it, this pressure of population upon food-supply has not, as a rule, been so close as to produce misery and degradation. The check to real over-population is very severe, but actual famine is generally due to vicissitude in the supply of food rather than to over-population. We may suppose that in primitive society as in later times, population will vary only slightly, while the sources of food remain the same; that in places where the food supply is very abundant, the population will rapidly increase, and that this expansion will result in

emigration to districts less favoured ; finally, that every new device or practice which makes the food supply more abundant and more constant, will occasion a rapid increase in population.

Turning from the comparatively simple matter of race expansion, we immediately find an obstacle to the further study of the race, in that the word itself raises so many questions. In familiar language, the word race is used to denote the fact that men are bound together by something that lies deeper in their nature, than the mere physical contiguity. But while this truth cannot be denied, and we continue to use word *race* to denote it, still ethnologists have come to no agreement as to what constitutes a race, and are in dispute even as to the extent of acknowledged races. One thing at least is clear, namely, that, under ordinary conditions, men can only live in groups strong enough to protect themselves ; the unarmed individual is no match for other animals, even if he is able to obtain food and to protect himself against the weather. And, farther, these groups must be small enough so that the members can work together and not too large to find a supply of food in a comparatively limited area. Such a unit, which we may call the tribe, is the actual working unit of early society ; in it is developed and perpetuated the culture by which it comes to be essentially different from other tribes. This semi-political

unit may contain individuals of such different character and antecedents that they are to be classified under different races, but in most cases a real likeness lies at the basis of the group, and is farther developed by the common life. On the other hand, the race will frequently extend beyond the tribe, for the tribe is definitely limited in number by its circumstances, while a prolific stock may speedily exceed these bounds, and make necessary a division of the tribe.

The essential likeness which leads an observer to classify a group of men as a race, is ordinarily due to blood-relationship. The physical character of the individuals composing the group is originally determined by their parents, their individual energy is largely a matter of birth and training; the habits, the needs, and the ends towards which action is ordinarily directed, are influenced but very slowly, if at all, by environment. These characteristics, which are grouped under the general name of heredity, may be called the internal factors correlative to the external influences of environment. Blood-relationship has a two-fold effect in the formation of social groups: (1) Descendants of the same ancestors have the same physical nature, and a tendency to develop the same psychical characteristics, so that social relations arise more easily between them, and can become more intimate; (2) children require care from the mother



for a considerable period in order that they may survive at all; and the common life during this period naturally develops into a higher social life later. [It is said that among animals those born of the same mother live together until there is some definite occasion for their separation. Espinas, *Sociétés*, pp. 459 sqq.] With the development of the family, and the distinct recognition of the importance of the blood-tie, the effect of blood-relationship on the formation of social groups becomes far more important. On this basis of common blood, there arises a sense of relationship to others than the members of one's own tribe or city, and the race becomes the larger social unit within which new rights and new duties are to be realised. At the same time, a real or fictitious blood-relationship becomes the basis of a more rigid structure of the tribe itself.

The origin of whatever unity the race may possess, has been made evident by the two preceding paragraphs. Men are or tend to be alike, when they have the same ancestry. This likeness due to blood-relationship is realised and developed in a common life. In general, race-unity is simply a matter of likeness, accordingly the scientific observer may draw the lines much as he chooses; it has depended largely on the temperament of the observer, whether he makes a few large races or numerous small races. The

question does not assume any great importance, except when the persistence of race characteristics is treated as the important factor in the development of culture. Looking back over the course of history, we naturally speak of the work of the Hebrew race, or of the Greek race, and we postulate a genius of the race as the correlate of the work which it has accomplished. In these instances, however, and ordinarily when the race has accomplished some definite mission, the unity of the race is no mere fiction of the scientist, but it has come to be recognised by the race itself. A race which is conscious of itself becomes thereby a unit, and its institutions will bear the race-mark with increasing distinctness. When races that are quite distinct come into contact with each other, such self-consciousness is rapidly developed and becomes the determining feature of the social organisation.

There are thus two factors determining the life of society, when this is considered from the physical standpoint; the external factor of locality, and the internal factor of heredity. The influences of locality are very strong in determining the course of social movements and the character of social organisation. In the new environment the individual develops differently, new modes of social activity arise, and the institutions that have originated under other circumstances, may be profoundly modified. After

all this has been said, the facts of race-persistence remain and cannot be neglected. Two races may be crossed and become blended into one, as has been the case in Mexico, or the weaker race may gradually die away before the stronger. The influences of locality alone have never been sufficient to assimilate two really different races; in America the power of the same climate, the same language, and the same social institutions, has not proved sufficient by itself to obliterate former differences between Indo-European races. Without accepting the results of those writers who profess to be able to analyse the population of England or of France into numerous distinct ethnic elements, we cannot fail to see that the effect of locality on the influences that are grouped under the name of heredity, is measured only by centuries or by tens of centuries, and that new and higher races are generally formed by the amalgamation of races originally distinct.

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## CHAPTER III

### ASSOCIATION: THE RELATION OF MEN IN SOCIETY

In the preceding chapter, the social group has been considered as a physical object determined by physical causes; but the unity of a social group is not fully explained by saying that it was "made so from outside," or that it was "born so." To stop here, is to let the lower truth take the place of the higher—a result that is fatal to all science. Chemistry and Physics do not take the place of Biology, though familiarity with these sciences is the necessary basis of any advance to a broader and more scientific biology. The physiology of the brain is the basis of a true psychology; it can never take the place of psychology and logic, but it is rather the condition of progress in these branches. Similarly the study of society from the physical side is only the basis of a study that is both broader and more direct. A society is a group of men; as such it must be studied and explained, if sociology is to be more than an empty name.

Two theories frequently advanced with reference to the relation of men in society, are suggested by the phrases, "man a social animal" and "social cohesion." The study of society has often begun and ended with the statement that man is a social animal, as though this were a fact too familiar to need discussion or criticism. Certainly civilisation makes man pre eminently the social animal, but by nature he may be a very different being. The study of uncivilised races to-day shows clearly that this is possible; the lower type of Veddahs in Ceylon and of Hottentots in Africa live in scattered groups of two or three or four, with no more sociability than is found among gorillas. If man is not necessarily and universally a social being, the phrase demands investigation before it can be accepted as the whole philosophy of society.

In truth, both social and unsocial tendencies are at work in each stage of social development; some forces tending to draw men closer together in society, and others tending to break up the societies thus formed. In the world of any creature, those of its own kind are the most prominent objects, and the beings about which sentiments of aversion or of pleasure are sure to cluster. In early stages of civilisation jealousy appears at least as soon and as commonly as sympathy, and anger is by no means a product

of civilisation. The bitterest conflicts arise among those who are seeking the same thing, so that association itself leads to strife, and even in the effort to unite men are driven farther apart. But oftentimes co-operation is the only means of obtaining any success; the individual alone cannot protect himself against attack, nor can he win from nature the means of subsistence. Under such circumstances the feeling of loneliness becomes unendurable, for it is associated with the sense of imminent danger. The mere presence of other men produces a feeling of security and satisfaction. The various forces of an advanced civilisation work in the same manner, strengthening the bonds that unite one group and weakening those that unite another. Many years ago, the workmen employed to unload vessels at the London docks were chosen each morning from among scores of hungry men who fought with one another to secure the chance to work. This unsocialising influence was entirely reversed when two or three able leaders convinced the men that their ends were better gained by union; and now the dock labour, like the older trades, is so organised that a common occupation binds the workers together.

In the long run, the necessities of man's position decide between the influences that strengthen social bonds and those that tend to destroy

society. Ordinarily, man must be a social being in order to survive; for progress, social life is absolutely necessary. So far as primitive man is concerned, there is some reason for thinking that he was not of choice a gregarious animal, but that a certain low degree of social life was generally necessary for his survival. The process of natural selection clearly results in the development of a gregarious instinct, for those who do not learn to enjoy the presence of their fellows have to contend single-handed with hostile forces, both physical and human. And *progress* always presupposes the social instinct; a tribe makes progress by reason of its strength and its quickness to learn, and both strength and quickness to learn depend on the social instinct that binds a tribe together and keeps it in active relation with other tribes. Progress for the individual means a larger share in the developing common life, it presupposes the social man. Genuine progress of society demands increasing solidarity in the component social groups; bonds of feeling, not simply of function, must unite these groups. Cases where this does not occur are abnormal if not uncommon, and such groups carry in themselves the seeds of their own disruption.

The bond of sentiment that unites men in society may be fairly described as mutual delight in companionship with each other. It involves

both readiness to give and to receive, though the different elements perhaps never receive the same emphasis in any two persons. It involves the readiness to give; to give one's time and interest in the service of others, to sympathise with their various emotions, to make allowance for their weaknesses, to recognise and admire what is excellent in them. On the other hand, it involves also a readiness to receive. Enjoyment of service and adulation is a sentiment that plays no small part in the social and, indeed, in the political world. But in the purest types of friendship, enjoyment of the service that love renders is as truly important as joy in serving. Reciprocal pleasure in companionship performs a most important function in welding together classes of men into real societies. It is not merely nature's stamp of approval on the utility of companionship; it becomes an additional bond uniting men in society more firmly, and assisting in the constant assimilation of heterogeneous factors. [On the importance of Sentiment as a Social Bond, *cf.* Novicow, *Les luttes entre sociétés humaines*, livre II, chap. VI.]

"Social cohesion" is a second phrase sometimes used to describe the union of men in a social group. A phrase so convenient often serves instead of any investigation of the facts, and satisfies those who are content with a new word as an explanation; but it is just about as



scientific as would be the phrase "biological cohesion." The parts of an animal are indeed bound together—they have a physical relation depending on propinquity; but the whole question is *why* they are thus bound together. The metaphor from physical science is peculiarly inapt, because it implies that the component elements are uniform, and that the law of their relation is very simple. In this sense it might be fair to speak of cohesion of a flock of sheep; but so far as organised society is concerned, all that the metaphor suggests beyond the mere fact of relation is false.

Biology furnishes an analogy that is richer and much nearer the truth. The question as to the bonds which unite the molecules in an animal's lung or brain may receive two answers. Undoubtedly the union can be stated in terms of physical and chemical forces. Chemical affinity, physical cohesion, etc., determine the place and movement of each atom of matter. It is possible to ask the reason for the particular arrangement and to get a more important if not a truer answer. Biology recognises that the character of an organ is determined by its function, its parts are arranged as they are, and change as they do, because the organ performs a definite function in relation to the other parts of the organism. The real bond that unites the parts of a lung is the fact that each part shares

in the function of the lung and contributes to the performance of that function. The parts form a whole because they work together. All that chemistry can contribute to the knowledge of the manner of the process, the biologist gladly welcomes; the fact of the process, and of the unity which it implies, he knows to begin with.

The unity of a society also is functional, and not simple "cohesion." The social group is not determined by any single factor, nor does an enumeration of its different parts tell the whole truth. The group is one because it has a common life, because its members are united in the performance of a common function. Members of the family depend on each other, and together they serve a common end in the larger group. Persons of the same rank in the social scale perform much the same functions for society, so that they easily develop a common life and a direct interdependence. In the industrial world, or in the intellectual world, groups are determined in the same manner. Men hunt together or spin together, and the permanence of the common activity is the measure of the permanence of the group. Voluntarily or not, men of the same period unite in the search for truth, and the intellectual group is determined by the extent of the common intellectual activity. A share in the same activity, the performance of

a common function, in itself unites individuals in functional groups. Performance of different functions with reference to a common whole tends to separate one social aggregate from another; yet at the same time it emphasises the bonds that unite each part into a definite group, and it connects the groups into a compound whole.

The study of social evolution sheds much light on the character of the bonds that consist in a common function. In the development of society new *needs* are constantly being developed; as they arise they are met by new *forms* of social activity; and the social "organs" which have been adjusted to one set of activities, must change so as to perform the more complex activities. In this process social groups are gradually made more definite and more stable, as the function in which their members unite is defined. A primitive group with no sharp line either circumscribing it or dividing its parts, is the basis of the family and the state. A confused idea of blood-relationship grows clearer and more definite until at length it assumes the form best adapted to secure permanence. Separation of the industrial and military forms of activity causes a separation into industrial and military classes. The function of a group, at first so vague, is gradually defined, and in consequence the group itself is more sharply defined from other groups. In a word, the study of social

evolution makes it clear that a definite form of social activity and a definite group of men engaged in that activity arise simultaneously; that is to say, the social group is determined from within, and the bond which unites its members is their share in the particular activity.

The differentiation of social functions and social groups results in making the bonds that unite men in a common activity more definite, more various, and more permanent. In the primitive "horde" no clearly defined bonds united the members. The group was largely determined from without and the only internal bond was due to those influences which are usually ascribed to heredity. The beginnings of a political and industrial organisation meant more definite bonds uniting men in society, because it meant more definite functions in the performance of which men were associated. The industrial and the social and the legal and political forms of activity were gradually separated, until each individual had his economic position in society, his social position, and his political position. In each form of activity he was united with a class of associates that were not quite the same in any two cases. In each new form of activity he gained new power, and, at the same time, he became more dependent on society; power and dependence alike are signs of the common life of which he has come to be

a part. Each new form of activity was a new and stronger bond uniting him with his fellows. To-day the economic forms of social activity are so complex that they almost defy analysis, and it is only possible to describe the most important varieties. Finally, the differentiation of social functions and social groups makes social ties more permanent. A man is bound to his neighbours in a hundred ways instead of one, and if the social structure is weak in one spot, strength elsewhere is likely to prevent its overthrow. The natural sentiment which led to a marriage may disappear; but respect for public opinion, or the legal difficulties of divorce, or the difficulty of meeting the needs of life alone, may any one of them suffice to prevent the breaking up of the family.

The further results of social evolution have affected the functional bonds, and the groups which were united by these bonds, differently in accordance with the character of the social group. In contrast with other social groups that expand as they develop, the family is by nature a closed group, and the whole process of evolution tends to emphasise this characteristic. Wherever the family has been expanded, it has lost its essential character and has failed to perform its function properly. The evolution of the social bonds is none the less evident in the case of the family, and in the process of evolution

the character of this social bond appears very clearly. The family has become more sharply defined and more permanent with each advance of culture, in particular it has been solidified as the forms of activity, into which it has entered, have become more various and more definite. The bond once easily sundered became far stronger when the family entered as a definite unit into industrial activity, for economic solidarity was a stronger bond than the merely domestic or social union. And as the members of the family share the same intellectual life, thus forming one body intellectually; as they become distinctly one in the eyes of the law and in their relation to the state, as they enter together into new and higher forms of moral and religious life, the solidarity of the family is indefinitely increased. A common share in new forms of life means that new bonds unite the members of a group and that by these bonds the closed group is solidified and made more permanent.

The results of evolution on social groups and the bonds that unite them, may be more apparent, though certainly not more important, in the case of expansive groups. Here the new complexity has full opportunity to show itself in uniting men into groups as they perform the new activities. As the life of a given set of men grows more complex, the inner structure of

the group shares the complexity ; wherever it is possible the new complex life reaches out beyond a given group, and social ties connect larger and larger numbers in society. The size of a society depends ultimately on the extent to which its common life may reach, and on the permanence to which the common life is adapted. Increasing complexity of social life requires a constantly expanding social structure, and firmly binds together the different parts of this growing structure. A complex social life requires an increasingly stable social structure and makes the structure stable by the great variety of bonds uniting each part with many other parts. The most apparent result of the larger common life and of the new bonds by which it unites individuals, is the rapid increase in the extent of the society thus formed.

The word *association*, which is ordinarily used to express the relation of men in society, has hardly been justified by the discussion thus far. We have seen that man is or becomes, in some measure, a social creature, and that he learns to enjoy more and more the very presence of companions. This pleasure is often independent of any mutual services, though it is almost sure to arise in connection with such services. Man is not wholly unlike the gregarious animals; society is bound together directly by bonds of feeling that may be described as attractive forces.

In regard to these forces, it may be observed first, that they are due to the character of the individuals in society, and that they increase or decrease as these individuals become "more social" or "less social." Even when such abstraction is made the direct end, it is hardly possible to study these bonds apart from the men they hold together, for they form a part of the life of individuals. And secondly, these bonds due to pleasure in companionship, are not primarily physical in character, but rather psychological. The social and the unsocial man cannot be immediately distinguished by any physical difference and there is little reason to believe that these traits are transmitted from father to son by heredity. Men enjoy the society of others when they have been trained to enjoy it; social life is a product of culture. Pleasure in society is the result of men's relation to a social and a moral environment, not of their relation to the physical environment. Delight in companionship is a psychological fact; it is a function of the individual's psychological life. The true name for the union of men in society is association.

A biological metaphor has proved useful in describing the general character of a social group. Society is so far an organism that its unity is determined by its life, and the unity of each part is determined by its function in the



life of the whole. The social group is one because it acts together; the true unity of society is functional.

Here, again, it is clear that the change from an unsocial to a social state is simply a change in the individuals forming the new group. No new power has appeared above and outside these men to make them work together and to restrain their selfish tendencies. They have learned to depend on each other, as a body they can accomplish what is impossible for any one to accomplish alone. The individual is so changed that he can only live in a complex group. The social bonds due to a common activity, are functions of the individual life. Secondly, it may be said of the bonds due to a share in the social activity, as of the bonds due to pleasure in the presence of others, that they are primarily, *psychical* in their character. In fact, as man becomes a social being, it is not so much his body that is changed, as it is the world in which he lives. This was an animal's world in which many things were to be feared, and a few were to be utilised to satisfy appetite. It becomes a human world, in which the important facts are not things but men, and life is made up of man's relations to his fellows. Even the very things in nature are changing, as men gain a larger scientific horizon, and as they find new means of utilising the gifts of nature. The world in

which a man lives is the world in which he has been brought up; this world of experience is a social fact, developed in society, and the same for the same social group. The development of social life is a psychical process; man, in company with his fellows, is developing a faculty of reason.

The word association naturally refers to the psychical relation of well-marked psychical units. The scientific study of society does not change this idea, but simply develops it. A man's delight in the presence of other men is no mere animal gregariousness; it is the delight of mind in contact with mind. Individuals choose this social life because it alone affords pleasure that can be called human. The more important bonds due to a share in the common activity are never fully described by any terms from biology. This common activity means the development and activity of reason; its character is essentially psychical. Moreover, its development is the development of individuals, and the common activity is the conscious effort of men to realise ends which they consciously propose to themselves.

We have discussed the physical basis of social life and it remains to suggest the relation between this physical basis and the psychical life which is developed from it. This is simply a question as to the conditions favouring the

development of association. Complex society shows two sets of influences at work, influences tending directly to aggregation and assimilation, and influences tending to separate and differentiate social elements. Each of these sets of influences in its own way favours the growth of association. This is clear enough in the case of the assimilating influences; men in the same locality come to share the same culture, society tends to become one, and its members enter into more and more intimate relation. The same effect, only within a more limited area, is produced by differentiating influences. The relation between employer and employed involves certain hostile elements which have been greatly emphasised in the present century. The direct effect of this is to bring the members of each class into closer relation with other members of the same class. The attitude of common hostility on the part of a class not only adds a new bond of considerable power, but it has a far more important function in developing more essential bonds of union which have remained unrealised or even unrecognised. Every form of social struggle, from war between nations to economic competition, religious strife, or intellectual ambition, has its effect in welding a larger or smaller class into closer association.

The distinctly physical facts of race and locality exercise both positive and negative

influences on the development of association. In the first place, locality tends to assimilate races and types of culture. Language is a good example of this. Two languages may be spoken in the same locality for a limited period, but, sooner or later, one drives out the other, or a new language is formed, uniting both constituents. When two religions have been thrown together, or two sets of moral habits, the result has been the same; one has driven out the other after being more or less modified by it. Life in the same locality means the same schools for the children, the same laws and government for the parents. Even climatic influences tend to develop the same habits. Where two races live together, intermarriage is inevitable, and a new race is the product of the two components. The differentiating influences of locality are mainly due to differences of climate. While the immediate effect of climate in uniting one set of people as over against another set is inconsiderable, some of the antagonism between the temperaments of different peoples may be traced to this source.

Blood-relationship, real or imagined, lies at the very basis of union in society. Economic relations, political unity, even language itself, are developed in the group which regards itself as a race; some religions have become universal, each religion is in origin the product of a race. Receiving a similar physical nature from

common ancestors, and sharing the psychical life which is their most valuable inheritance, members of the same race have by nature the strongest bonds of union, and union of any sort tends to develop closer psychical relationship. At certain periods in the history of the world, a race and a society have become so far identical, that strangers who have come to share the culture of the society are at length regarded as members of the race. In a word, the physical group underlies the psychical group; identity of race favours association. Hostile relations to other groups of men have been no small factor in the production of firmly united races. Men may be born alike, but, ordinarily, they must be taught this likeness before they recognise it. Pressure from outside is necessary to produce a compact union. Social struggle has played a considerable part in the production even of races.

The physical conditions favouring association, race, and locality, are by far the most important; but as society develops, there are certain social intellectual conditions which have such an important influence on association, that they cannot be overlooked.

These are roughly classified in the following table:—

Social factors. Rank : Rulers and ruled ; slaves,  
Nobility, bourgeoisie,  
peasants.

Vocation : Artisans, carpenters,  
metal workers. Merchants,  
wholesale, retail. Intellectual pur-  
suits, etc.

Psychical factors : Thought and language.  
Beliefs and Science.  
Temperament, morals,  
art. Religion.

The most important bonds uniting men are the bonds of a common function, of a share in some common activity. So it needs no proof that identity of vocation to whatever this may be due, is a very important influence favouring association. Men are led to choose their vocation quite generally by some particular taste or habit of mind, so that it is common to find a certain identity of temperament among those pursuing the same calling. The same work, and the pursuit of work along with companions, also tend to produce a similar habit of mind within a given group. But this bond due to similarity, is only half the story. Those in the same trade are united in the performance of the same function for society. The work of carpenters may leave them a considerable degree of independence, while men must unite in large factories to produce guns or carriages successfully. And yet, however great their apparent independence, each class of workers is directly

united in the performance of its common function for society.

Nor is it difficult to see that those belonging to the same rank in society are naturally brought into association, whatever may be the principle by which rank is determined. Wherever society is somewhat stable, members of the same rank in society have received from their parents a physical nature peculiar to the class. Then they are trained in the same habits of thought and action. Quite generally they have access only two particular callings, and indeed they have tastes suited only to these callings. Besides these conditions strongly favouring association, it is often possible to point out some general function for the service of society, in which members of the same rank are directly united.

We have seen already that those who are thrown together, naturally tend to have the same language, the same range of thoughts, the same scientific view of the world, the same aesthetic, moral, and religious needs. Here it is only necessary to point out the fact that the converse of this is equally true. Identity of language, similarity of thoughts, habits, and needs, are conditions strongly favouring the development of association. Such identity and similarity are not only products of association; they are the most important factors in determining the further development of association.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE SOCIAL MIND

"The laws according to which the psychical activity of the individual is awakened and developed, may be called psychology. There must be similar laws also for the whole nation. The nation, as well as the individual man, is one being"—[Humboldt, *Ges Werke*, IV, S. 427 .

The first aim of sociology is to understand the character of the object with which it has to deal—the society or social group. In the preceding chapters, it has been shown that this group may be described as "organic," that its character is, in a measure, determined by physical causes, but that, in its essential nature, it is truly an association of persons whose feelings and activities bring them together in the common social structure. A social group is made one by the pleasure its members find in each other's companionship, and by the necessity of union in order that the group may perform its proper function. The solidarity which is primarily due to these causes and which is constantly reinforced by the same causes, gains



a much wider range and takes a deeper hold than was indicated in the discussion of the principles of association. The proof then offered that the sources of social unity are psychical forces, was somewhat negative in character. It remains to be shown that the solidarity of a society embraces all phases of the psychical life that it develops; that the social life of man is, in truth, the unfolding of reason; that the unity of the social group is the unity of a social mind.

In any highly developed organism it is possible to study the life of the whole in its effect on the separate elements of which it is composed. In the case of society the temptation to adopt this course has proved almost irresistible. The characteristics of the new life developed in the group, and the results gradually produced by this common life, are deposited in the individual mind; the leaders of thought and activity are, of necessity, individuals; the highest and most striking product of society is the personality which man feels to be himself. It is no wonder that logic and ethics, history and economics, are studied from the standpoint of the individual, while the social character of the truth thus studied is only vaguely indicated by an occasional reference to environment. Yet it is not difficult to see that all the distinctive features of man, as man, are social products, both in their origin and in their present form.

In the first place, intellectual possessions and capacity and activities belong to the group as a whole. For instance, language is never the invention of a single man, nor can any man claim it as a private possession. This is plain enough in the case of different peoples, and attention is frequently called to the fact that the popular dialect of a district is the peculiar property of that district; but we may go further and say that each clearly marked social class, each trade group, and even each family, has its own language. So the range of thoughts possessed and used by any group is limited, and characterises one group in distinction from another. The teacher impresses his mind on the school, the father on the family, and the family or school becomes an intellectual group by itself. In religious matters, the range of thought in the denomination and in the individual church is limited. The words "soul," "revelation," "divine justice," have very different meanings for different bodies of religious thinkers, but within a given church the meaning of each is practically the same. In a word, these ideas are the property of a social group. Only members of the same group can really understand each other. The same truth holds good of different ages. The philosophical, or scientific, or religious ideas of one age differ essentially from those of another; the thoughts

of any age are not directly and completely intelligible to an earlier or a later stage.

The primary beliefs which are generally accepted, and from which the thinker must start, are, in like manner, the property of the group. Philosophical scepticism appears in certain ages, and affects particular classes. The belief of the present class in Europe as to matters physical and spiritual, mundane and heavenly, may be formulated without special difficulty; and it differs no less from the belief of the same class in some other type of civilisation, than from the belief of the educated class in Europe. Changes in these beliefs sweep over a whole country at times, as in the case of the appearance and disappearance of witchcraft in New England. Even in the mind of a trained thinker the evidence in favour of a given proposition rarely has the same weight as the statement that it is accepted by a class of minds which commands his respect.

The common ideas of a group and of an age include in particular the practical knowledge, the tools, and the methods of attaining the ends desired. Students of primitive society speak of a stone age and a bronze age; more limited periods are distinguished by the special forms of utensils, their decoration, and the skill shown in their manufacture. As civilisation advances, utensils vary more rapidly from age to age,

and more widely in different groups in the same age. Weapons, tools, and utensils are the property of the social group, and no individual possession. So the methods of agriculture and of hunting, of preparing food and partaking of it, of preparing and wearing clothing, are indeed followed by the individual, but they are the possession of the age and the social group in which he finds himself.

Finally, intellectual activity may be predicated of the group with quite as much truth as of the individual. Each age and each people—one might even say each class—has its own way of going at a problem that demands solution. There are *a priori* methods and empirical methods; one age demands metaphysical proof; to-day we take pride in studying everything inductively; one group uses concrete symbols, and another abstract ideas, as its instruments of investigation. These methods and the activity which finds expression through them, are characteristic of social groups. Even the standard of truth varies with the social group. Many ages and peoples have regarded the miracle as the best possible proof of things supernatural, to-day some classes find in miracles a stumbling-block to their faith. The proof of a metaphysical system often is only its own perfectness and beauty, but such systems have not lacked followers. Tradition has been another standard of truth,

physical authority yet another. None of these various standards of truth have belonged to individuals as such; in fact it is by the very nature of things impossible that the test of what truth is, should belong to an individual. A proposition is true when it commands assent, when it can be "proved"; and these words "assent" and "proof" mean assent by a group of men and proof that satisfies a group of men.

Secondly, it is reasonable to assert that the social group has volitional characteristics, such as are commonly regarded as distinctive of the individual. Habits are the possession of an age and a class quite as truly as of a particular man. For instance, each social class in a given nation, at a given time, has common habits as to its food. The bill of fare does not vary much from family to family; sauerkraut, beef, Indian corn, stand for particular peoples in the mind of every reader. The table furnishings, number and time of meals, table manners change, as one turns from class to class, rather than from family to family. Habits of family organisation, of marriage and divorce, mark one country and one age. Habits of social intercourse, such as the time and manner of calls, the character of social gatherings, the mode of entertainment and topics of conversation at such gatherings, the extent and character of the groups that have social intercourse with each other; all these are determined by the

habits of the class and age in question. In particular, habits of virtue are the property of the group. It is part of the history of ethics, as yet largely unwritten, to show that the virtues men prize and cultivate have varied from age to age, in different nations and even in different families. It is an evident fact that truth-telling, generosity, patience, pertinacity, justice, receive very different emphasis in different families; the habits of virtue vary in these families, and the persons who go out from them ordinarily carry with them the virtues of the group in which their character has been formed. The history of virtues, like the history of other habits, can only be written from the standpoint of the group, never from the standpoint of the individual, this fact alone justifies the statement that habits belong to the group.

And not merely the history of virtues, but the judgment of action as well, conscience itself, is a social fact. Whatever the origin of conscience, it is to-day the application of the group's standard to the action of the member of the group. "By the law is the knowledge of sin" is nothing but a statement of the fact, that the sanction of the law of the state, or of the precept of the Church, or of public opinion, is the power that wakens conscience. The child's conscience is just as truly a family product as his power to use language. Whole races seem to us to lack

conscience, either because we cannot understand the content of right and wrong which it enforces or oftentimes because the common life and culture of the group is so little developed that the feeble germ of a future conscience cannot as yet be detected. [Many efforts of a rather absurd character have been made to deduce conscience from other factors of the individual's psychical life; the real reason for their failure is to be found in the fact that conscience is not developed by the interaction of a group of feelings and ideas, be they ever so altruistic, but rather by the interaction of gradually developing personalities.] The religious man hears God's voice in the commands of duty as he hears it in the revelation of truth, but both the command or revelation and the power to apprehend them come through his share in social life.

The earliest ethical reflection has generally taken the form of a search for the highest good ; and this is natural, for a man's first conscious effort to regulate his own life is the effort to attain some definite end. The immediate concrete end of action is evidently a social fact. No boy cultivates skill in playing marbles when his companions disdain it; a man seeks to run his loom well, or tell a story well, because these accomplishments are prized by the group of which he is a member. And the great ends which are gradually being worked out in society,

often unconsciously so far as the members of society are concerned, can never be the property of a single person. It is true that they find their highest realisation in the person of individuals, but only because such individuals are the genuine product of society. Spencer distinguishes military societies and industrial societies; others have added to this list an ethical type, now supposed to be in process of realisation. In each case the type is a social product. To take a particular example, each church to-day has a special type of religious experience which it seeks to cultivate among its members, and when one's view is extended beyond the present century, these types vary even more widely. Members of a church have a similar religious life, because that type is the social product and the social possession of their church.

Thirdly, the group may truly be said to have its own emotional life. Nothing develops the sense of individuality so distinctly as the feeling of joy or sorrow, of satisfaction, or of eager desire, which man calls most peculiarly his own; yet even these are not his individual possession. He develops the capacity for them by his intercourse with his fellows; the immediate occasion of any particular feeling is quite generally found in some particular relation to the human world of which he is a part; and, whatever its occasion, each new feeling has a



tendency to communicate itself to all that comes in contact with it. The communication of feeling, of course, takes place most readily when a body of persons is subject to the same exciting cause of feeling. Empty benches do not inspire an orator, and what is even more true, they do not inspire the scattered members of the audience. The revivalist preacher gets his audience to sing together, and the wave of common feeling will respond to appeals of another character. Enthusiasm is a social product, just as coals burn together, common types of feeling have come to mark each age and each nation. There was an age of chivalry, an age called the New Birth, the Renaissance, and there has been many an age marked by doubt and despair. A nation, too, may be described by its tone of feeling—the French people are called witty, gay, and careless, with much spirit, and little power of perseverance; North Germany is said to be marked by a melancholy dreaminess, and by great energy and devotion when the people are once roused. Such characterisations are likely to contain quite as much falsehood as truth; yet the fact is recognised by every traveller, that the types of feeling in the peoples among whom he goes are different enough from what he has been accustomed to at home.

The final characteristic of the individual's mental life is his self-consciousness; he learns

to feel the unity of himself, as over against the unity of his world. In some cases, the social group is wholly without this recognition of a common mental life. Those who speak the same language are hardly likely to perceive that they share a mental life in common; the consciousness of it only arises when a man meets those with whom he can converse freely, after passing some time in lands where only a strange language is heard. The different industrial classes and social classes in a city only recognise the common life of the class, when this life is emphasised by contrast with some other type, or by conflict of class with class. The recognition of a common life and of common ends in life is the true basis of the unity of a social group; until this takes place, the unity is a possibility to be realised, the common life is only incipient. Sometimes physical separateness suggests the fact that a group has a unity of its own. Children feel that the family has a common life, since the life of the home is separated at so many points from all the rest of the world. Or pleasure in a certain set of companions may emphasise the unity of that particular set; as when a school develops a common life that is not limited to the intellectual side. Frequently pressure from outside throws men together, and makes them feel that their only interests are such as are common to the whole

class. The efforts of labourers to secure what they regard as their rights, unite them by firm bonds into a "union," and favour the belief that the individual has no interest apart from the class. Thus a somewhat exaggerated self-consciousness is developed under pressure. Finally, it may be said that every society, formed with the purpose of encouraging and developing some form of common life, presupposes recognition of a common life already existing. A church is formed by persons who have recognised that they already share a common religious life, the friends of "law and order" form a society because such a union aids them to act together, but doubtless they have long been conscious that they shared with each other common thoughts, feelings, and purposes.

The recognition that the group is by nature a unity is more distinct, however, when some element of purpose underlies the union. When a society is definitely formed to carry out a definite purpose, its members are separated from the rest of the world, their common life is emphasised as the basis of this separateness, and this is done by their choice. Under these circumstances, the consciousness of a common life, a common self, sometimes becomes quite as vivid as the individual's self-consciousness. The industrial corporation develops the common life and the consciousness of it along narrow

lines ; the family, at the opposite extreme, develops a common life along the whole range of human interests, and the self-consciousness of such a group may easily eclipse the self-consciousness of husband or wife. Every great crusade against ignorance, corruption, or evil of any form, every earnest effort to realise high ideals in the world, demands union among those who would carry it forward ; the voluntary group thus formed cannot fail to have a vivid consciousness of its common life.

The question as to the unity of the social mind becomes clearer when the nature of the unity of the individual mind is considered. The mind of the individual is, indeed, the function of a particular physical structure ; but its true unity is rather psychical than physical. The mind is a unity because all thoughts, feelings, acts, are referred to a common subject in self-consciousness ; the consciousness of this subject is gradually developed, thoughts and feelings are gradually organised, voluntary acts are brought more under the influence of a definite ideal, until at length the unity of a person stands out clearly in all the complexity of mental life. It may, of course, be possible to find a sort of physical unity of the social group ; the question is unimportant, for the real unity of mind is not a physical but a psychical matter. Such a psychical unity is

developed in the social group, though the development is gradual, and takes place in different degrees. Wherever a group is subject to influences developing its common life, the common thoughts and beliefs and feelings are gradually organised into a complex unity, more definite ideas control the active life of the group, and the consciousness of the essential unity of the whole at length pervades the life of each member. A society is no mere conglomerate of men that are alike, no mere association which men may share or leave at will ; the solidarity of the social group that has been indefinitely and imperfectly described by the word " organic," finds its true explanation in the psychical life of the group.

" Social Mind " and " Zeitgeist " are phrases easy to use, particularly easy to use without any definite meaning. In the first part of this chapter, I have simply attempted to give a definite concrete meaning to the former phrase, so that it could be profitably used to describe the psychical character of the social group. The different groups which go to make up society in a given nation or a given race, are determined in various ways ; physical contiguity or desire for companionship may have been the original deciding factor ; but the real unity of each group consists in the common mental life which is gradually acquired. This is the true statement of the essential

nature of a society. A group of men becomes really one as a common mental life is developed among them; they learn to call themselves one when at length they recognise this common mental life.

At this point the question naturally arises whether it is advantageous for society that this unity expresses itself in the outward form of some institution. The cry is often raised that our age spends its life in conventions, associations, and the like, while the ends which really demand our effort are obscured by the machinery for accomplishing them. Undoubtedly the machine is often a form which takes the place of real life; too easily it becomes an end in itself, and so can no longer justify its own existence. Still those who raise this cry may forget that the forms of social activity are really becoming more widely differentiated in this age as in the ages that have preceded it, and institutions are necessary to the new forms of common life. In spite of all the dangers that attend institutions, where a genuine common life demands an outward organisation as the means for realising its ends, the utility of such an organisation can hardly be doubted.

The only recognition of the dependence of the individual mind on the social medium which appears in current thought, is indicated by the

word "environment." The doctrine of environment simply recognises the fact of this dependence on the social medium, without going on to study its meaning either for the individual or for society. Animal life involves a series of changes in correspondence with the changing circumstances in which it is placed; these circumstances are called its environment, accordingly it is correct to say that its life is in large measure determined by its environment. The metaphor from biology has only a partial truth, when it is applied to minds in their relation to the social medium. Its truth consists in the fact of constant vital dependence which marks this relation; its error is that it always seems to separate the individual from that of which he really forms a part. In biology this error is unimportant, for social relations are the least essential part of the influences which affect the physical life of an organism. When, however, the figure is transferred to the psychical sphere, the error is unduly exaggerated; the environment which is by far the most potent to mould the developing mind, is just that common psychical life of which the individual is a constituent factor. [Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie, III, S. 53.] Indeed, the psychical environment is nothing but a series of such minds, and the whole question to be solved is the principle of their relation.

The common life of a social group is essentially the union of the ideas, the wills, and the feelings of men who have been thrown together in the attainment of common ends. Such a union arises as the result of a psychical change of individuals composing the group, so that perhaps it is fair to say that it consists of the common features of the mental life of these individuals. Psychical life is no secretion of a single man's brain; psychical life means that different minds are working together in the same activity, and this psychical life is a common life of the group. The factors of the social group are indeed distinct, and their real independence increases as it has larger field with the increasing psychical life; the mental life of the group exists in and through its members. In a word, the social mind has no existence outside the minds of the members of the group, and these individuals have no real mental life, except as they enter into the common life of which they form a part. In carrying out this doctrine, it is of course, important to bear in mind that the group in which the individual finds and develops his psychical life, is ordinarily not simple, but very complex, and that this relation is in large measure independent of time.

In conclusion, we should remember, that the social mind and all its powers are the product of association. As individuals enter into the



psychical relation described by this word, psychical life is developed at the same time for the members of the group and for the group as a whole. Accordingly, every thing that favours a more active interrelation of nascent minds, favours equally the development of the social mind which is the essence of society. When groups or individuals, with different training, are brought in contact with each other, the conditions of progress are fulfilled, for progress is the broadening and deepening of common life. In the complex relations of modern society there exists the best basis for mental achievement which the world has as yet produced, for this complex life means the constant and energetic inter-activity of factors by nature very different.

#### THE SCIENCE OF SOCIETY AND THE SCIENCES OF MAN.

The fundamental importance of the science of society is most clearly seen from the standpoint of the present discussion. In general terms, the close relation of sociology, psychology, and history, could be outlined in the introduction. At this point, the character of the interrelation of the sciences is made more definite, and the contribution of sociology to their progress can be more distinctly outlined.

The study of the social mind, the mind of the social group, has already made it evident that a true science of history will deal with groups rather than with individuals. It is true enough that the great man, the leader in historical changes, is the heightened example of the type of a class ; motives and influences may be more easily detected by studying such an example, and forces at work in history may thus be presented to the student with greater vividness. The fact remains that the real source of political changes is to be found in the life of the nation, and of the classes composing the nation ; and the thorough student of history must be equipped with what sociology has to teach, as to the nature of the social group. The more limited history of civilisation deals solely with the social group ; and, in fact, its whole aim is to give a record of the growing content of the social mind, together with the causes of the growth. It starts with the recognition of the social mind, and its success is conditioned by a knowledge of the nature of this mind. It studies the developing civilisation of a particular group, and here, too, its success depends on a knowledge of the laws that govern the development of social groups in all their various aspects.

Volumes have been written to show how the complex processes of the developed mind have

been evolved out of some simple process, that can be explained in terms of simple nervous action in the brain. Sometimes the child's development has been made the basis of this study; more commonly it has proceeded on hypothetical grounds; the end remains the same, *viz.*, to explain the evolution of complex psychical processes out of simple elements. Much of this labour would have been spared, or, at any rate, it would have been turned into a profitable channel, if the student had recognised that this evolution is not a feature of the individual mind, but of the social mind. The individual mind receives these capacities as a gift from its social environment; more exactly, it develops these capacities by sharing more and more completely in the social mind of which it is destined to form a part. The manner in which it develops these capacities and processes may or may not imitate the manner in which they were originally acquired; in any case, the true place to solve the problems of psychogenesis is in the history of the social mind, and not in the history of the individual mind. Even the theory of natural selection, with all the new light it has shed on this matter, does not permit the student to lose sight of the social group. Races, or groups of men, rather than individual men, are the units to the survival of which progress is due; and in this process the social

mind which enables the group best to meet the conditions of life, is favoured and developed.

A glance at races in different stages of development is sufficient to show that the interest in particular objects, and the power to concentrate attention upon particular objects, varies greatly. This interest and power, the individual shares with the group, and the factors at work in its development can only be understood by a study of the group life. In a word, the power of abstraction and attention is the result of association. As men and groups of men with different training and education are brought into living relation with each other, the same objects come to be regarded from different sides, until their individuality stands out with greater distinctness. Each member of the new group brings an interest in a slightly different set of thing, so that the range of interest for the group is enlarged. Finally, natural selection tends to perpetuate each genuine acquirement in breadth of interest, and particularly in the power to apprehend individual things with greater distinctness and definiteness. The evolution of the power of attention is to be studied in the social mind, for it originates here. Similarly the power of generalisation and classification is a social product, not to be explained by any study of the individual mind. Different stages of civilisation show this power in very

different degrees. The savage can count up to five, or, perhaps, ten. The Australians, it is said, have a rich vocabulary of words for birds and fishes, but no general word for bird or fish. Some tribes of North American Indians had different words for "my father" and "your father," not having reached so abstract a word as "father." This habit of mind, like the habit of attention to particular objects, the individual gets from society by taking the place open to him in the mental life of the group. It is in the social mind that its genesis is to be studied, for it is a product of association. The very desire to communicate with one's fellows, and the evolution of language to which this desire leads, have a great influence in training the mind to neglect unimportant differences, and to seize on the deeper likeness. By the thought-intercourse of different social factors, a scientific idea of the world is gradually formed and filled out; in this process the individual's powers are ever being quickened and developed. The contact and amalgamation of different groups, whatever quickens intercourse, will thus have its effect on the development of the psychical powers. Here, again, natural selection tends to perpetuate real acquirements, for a higher and truer idea of the world enables a tribe better to cope with the physical and psychical world in which it has to win a place for itself. Memory, too;

the power of judgment by which worth is assigned to the parts of one's world; the power of choice; these, and all men's psychical powers are developed in society, and so their genesis must be studied in society.

Finally, the study of fundamental principles and the study of norms and ideals, has much to gain from a study of the social mind. Experience presupposes some *a priori* conceptions or principles, and without these it is entirely impossible to understand it. While it is true that these principles which underlie experience, are not developed in experience, it is no less true that the knowledge of them has been acquired gradually; this process is to be studied in the history of the social mind. The existence of such a thing as universally valid experience, and of universal principles which underlie this experience, is perhaps the clearest evidence of the function of the social mind. A fact is true when it commends itself not merely to one, but to every mind which has the same evidence before it, and the same power of judging. Truth means that the social mind, at a certain stage of development, accepts some ideas and beliefs as absolutely valid; the principles underlying experience work in and through the social mind, and truth is the stamp of agreement with these principles which is set on facts by the social mind.

It is equally true that norms and ideals exist in the social mind, and work through it. These do not have universal validity, but, we say, they *ought* to be universally true. Duty is imposed by the social mind; an action is right, and is required, when the social mind sets on it the stamp of agreement with the norms and ideals which characterise this phase of society. To say that a truth comes from the social mind, is not to condemn it but to give the immediate explanation of it.

Further example is unnecessary to show that the sciences dealing with man are concerned fundamentally with the social mind. The partial neglect of this fact, in certain periods, has led to the false statement of problems, and false methods of investigation.

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## CHAPTER. V

### CAUSES OF SOCIAL ACTIVITY

Social groups, as has already been shown are properly functional in character, *i.e.*, the groups are distinct from each other, and have an existence of their own, because the members of them have formed the habit of acting together. Accordingly, it is necessary to study the different modes of social activity, and the causes of this activity, before it is possible to understand the true character of the social groups thus formed. Those writers who have recognised this dynamic character of society have generally discussed the topics of the present chapter under the title "social forces," and in choosing a different term we may properly point out the misconception which we believe is involved in the use of the former one.

Social force properly denotes the energy of a social group. This force is essentially the same, and is to be determined in the same way, for each of the different kinds of social groups. A political group is strong to contend with other groups, political or economic or moral, when the elements which compose it are strong, and when



these different elements can work harmoniously together. The energy of an economic corporation, or of a school of thought in the intellectual world, is to be determined in the same manner. In other words, the force or energy of a social group is something wholly independent of the kind of group; and while the study of the force of social bodies is very important, it sheds no light on the real nature of the different kinds of social groups, or on the structure of the society which they form. Social forces do not exist, but only social force, and the study of this force belongs to the study of the general composition of a social group. Finally, social force is to be predicated of the group as a whole; social stimuli act upon individuals, and may be called social only because they lead to social activity.

All social activity may be traced back to motives felt by the individual; and the character of the activity, as well as its intensity, is determined by the stimulus from which it springs. While social force is purely quantitative, the stimuli to social activity are first of all qualitative, and are distinguished by their different qualities. In as much as all social activity finds its starting-point and stimulus in the individual, we should study man's desires and emotions as social stimuli. The life of society is so bound up with the life of the units which compose it, that a study of the individual's motives

to action leads directly to the different forms of activity which characterise society.

In general the stimuli to social activity may be classified as original and derived. The first class includes those needs and emotions which are practically universal, and which do not depend on a developed state of society for their existence. The derived stimuli include such needs and emotions as imply a somewhat advanced state of society, and only arise in the course of social development. The first class will include (*a*) the need of food and clothing, which gives rise to the sensations of hunger and of cold; (*b*) the need of protection against one's fellow-men, which occasions the feeling of fear; and (*c*) the need of companionship, and the emotions associated with the relation of individual men. The activity due to these stimuli will vary exceedingly in the course of social development but these needs of men remain the basis all life in society. The second class may be called derived stimuli, for social life itself develops new desires, and these in turn lead to higher forms of social activity. Under this head may be included aesthetic desires, intellectual needs, the need of moral approval, and, finally, the need of religious communion.

The need of food is the original spur to social activity, and the last to lose its force.

It was undoubtedly true of early man, as it is true of wolves and vultures, that they joined in the pursuit of food whenever the greater results thus obtained compensated for the difficulty of getting along together. Roots may be grubbed up and fruits gathered in their season by scattered individuals, but there are few animals which man could capture unarmed and alone. Tools can only be evolved and transmitted in society, and every permanent gain in the battle for sustenance must have been due to combined activity. The domestication of animals and the cultivation of grains was possible only when man had learned to depend on his neighbours for constant aid as well as for protection. The need of food in constant supply and in sufficient variety has always led to associated activity, for it could only be satisfied by such associated activity. The same need has always continued to be a factor in social progress because the more highly developed a society is, the better it is able to meet the economic needs of its members.

The need of protection against cold and wet is hardly less important than the need of food, in its effect on social activity and on social progress. The common form of clothing among the more primitive tribes is the skin of an animal, and in order to obtain it, several individuals have joined in the hunt. The rude cloth, which

in many places succeeded fur as a garment, was both a social invention and a social product, again, men come to need a dwelling, though caves and trees may serve the purpose for a while. The form of this dwelling is gradually perfected in society, and transmitted in social tradition. Generally the dwelling is put up by the group, requiring associated activity to produce it. Moreover the house is not inhabited by one man alone but by a family or a group of families. Thus the need of protection against cold and wet tends to bring a group into closer and closer relations, until these units have sufficient solidarity to become factors in some permanent large group. The dwelling has also an important influence on the character of the social group, in that it is the beginning of privacy. Neither virtue nor the individuality which virtue implies is possible when men live together without means of seclusion. This means of seclusion the dwelling may furnish, so that it may fittingly be called the beginning of civilisation.

Man is the only animal so far as known which uses fire. Fire is important in satisfying both man's need of suitable food and his need of protection against cold. In this latter capacity it serves the same purpose as the dwelling-house in bringing men together, and teaching them to enjoy each other's society. Its warmth is genial,

in that it renders those who gather about it genial toward each other and fond of each other's society. For every age the hearth is the symbol of the home. Somewhat difficult to obtain and to preserve, fire is distinctly a social possession, and those who would enjoy it must remain members of society.

With the beginning of a proper economic activity, the need of food and of protection against cold and wet becomes even more potent factors in the production of active social life. This economic activity generally began with the introduction of slavery. Warriors preserved their captives when they produced more food than they carried on their bones. The economic needs which formerly had been satisfied by labour or by plunder, now led to the introduction of that great institution which has been the starting-point of human culture. When once slavery became general, masters had the possibility of leisure for other forms of activity, and the complex fabric of truly human society began to arise. The same needs which led to the introduction of slavery contributed to sustain it. The master provided his slaves with food and clothing, they gathered about his hearth as members of his household, he possessed the fire where they found protection against the cold. Thus the patriarchal household was secure and stable because in its life master and

slave alike found these fundamental needs satisfied.

In the whole course of industrial progress these original needs of man have remained the strongest and most universally potent, and to-day they are still fundamental. In regions naturally barren, or where social conditions have made it difficult to secure sustenance, the higher forms of society have never prospered. Only when men are fed and warmed have they any leisure or interest for higher social activities. And those who deal with the degenerate classes learn to appreciate the force of these needs as spurs to progress. The most hopeless cases are those which practically have no standard of living and are ready to accept whatever fortune brings. The first work of the man who would help such cases is to make them feel new needs, to make them dissatisfied with having nothing, that, in the effort for something, the habit of effort may be formed.

Upon these fundamental stimuli depends the whole industrial fabric. They are as potent to rouse men to activity when each individual performs some slight part in preparing goods for the world-market, as when a savage provides the food of a savage for himself and his family. Stupendous economic institutions have been called into being, the whole world has become one vast society for the production and

interchange of goods, and the stimuli which have given rise to the whole and still keep it in motion are these simple needs of man's physical nature. The economic structure is as universal as these needs—practically no one can separate himself from it and live. And it will appear later that this structure is the basis of the higher forms of social life. Political life and the state have arisen in the effort to defend property as well as life. The economic struggle for existence has become fairly an intellectual struggle and mind is developed in the effort to maintain a position in the economic world. Moral rules and æsthetic ideals are not independent of economic life, but are rather its offspring.

Thus with the development of society the power of these needs becomes greater, the activity occasioned by them grows more varied, and the range of this activity is increased. The savage eats when he has game, and takes no thought of another meal in the future ; hunger comes over him, and once more he feels an impulse stimulating him to activity. The civilised man feels the constant power of these stimuli, and all his life is governed with reference to the satisfaction of these needs as they recur. And with complex society these stimuli are no longer satisfied by what will merely sustain life and protect the body from extremes of temperature. Society has created a

higher "standard of living" as it is called, and that determines the food and the clothing that are needed. The number of courses absolutely necessary for dinner depends on rank in society; fashion decides what clothing is required; the dwelling-house is not for protection but for "comfort." Under the altered conditions the activity stimulated by these needs changes its entire character. In order to supply the present needs more activity is necessary, and activity in a far greater and more complex social organisation. They can only be satisfied in a stable organisation, so that as they become more complex men hesitate more and more before lending countenance to schemes subversive of the existing social order. Finally, the ideals associated with the "standard of living" have an important influence in shaping other forms of social activity than the economic.

The second original social stimulus is the need of protection against one's fellow beings. In all stages of society, but particularly in the lower, hostile influences surround man. An

individual must have some means of defence, either fight or speed to run away. Many quarters of the globe where speed nor his strength of arm can protect him from his foes. He must rely on some higher means of defence or perish; and it is only as men fight in groups, and with the



reason that is developed and transmitted by mutual intercourse that they can hope to subdue to themselves the beasts of the field. But the worst foe of man is man himself. Under peculiar circumstances, some savage races have lived in such small and fluid groups that, on the whole, they have succeeded in avoiding each other. Ordinarily this is impossible, and man has found protection from his fellows by uniting with his fellows. We find the same process as in the formation of physical units; the component parts form temporary and ever changing alliances in their ceaseless competitions with each other. For man protection means defensive strength; and the need of this leads to union, to the beginnings of a common life that may become political. Such groups, with strength to defend the individual, are a necessity, and expulsion from the tribe may amount to a sentence of death, this need of protection manifests itself in the emotional life as fear, and the fear of hostility has come to have, as a part of its very being, the instinct for union, so that nothing is so potent as fear to kindle delight in the presence of others. Many savage tribes only unite in the presence of a common danger, and fear is always a potent force in developing functional bonds of union.

The degree of strength (defensive or offensive) which a tribe is likely to attain, is in large

measure determined by the demands made on it. The phrase, "balance of power," has scarcely any meaning in the politics of savage tribes; to find a place among strong tribes, a tribe must itself be strong, else it cannot preserve its independence. Nor is a tribe likely to develop great strength among weak neighbours; where pressure from outside is lacking, an empire may break up through the very repulsion of its parts, so soon as the military power which constructed it grows weak. Thus the form in which this need of protection is met, is determined by natural selection. Strength is developed according to the need, and the tribe that fails to develop it goes to the wall.

The rude political body thus formed as a protection for life, is a most important social unit. It is the germ of the state, and under the protection of its growing power we may expect to find the beginnings of true economic life, and the more rapid advancement of social and psychical life. In this group the individual finds, in the first place, protection from outside, a little world in which ordinarily he can live at peace; and such peace is the first condition of progress. Secondly, he is obliged to cultivate a *modus vivendi* with his fellows who are members of the same little world. Here we find the beginnings of the property; men agree to respect certain possessions of their neighbours. Here also are to be found

the beginnings of law and rights and perhaps the beginnings of ethics.

With the development of society, the function of protection becomes even more important than at first, for the higher stages of culture depend absolutely upon such a shelter from outside attack as is afforded by the state. A higher civilisation has so much more at stake, as it rises from lower stages, that those who prize it will sacrifice correspondingly more to shelter it. Undoubtedly the cost of Government is excessively great to-day, but comparatively few murmurs are heard against this. The debt of civilisation to the state takes form in the sentiment of patriotism, which is gradually developed as the strongest support of the state, and we only know the strength of this sentiment when some danger impends.

At the same time the state continues to protect a man from his neighbours, for it is this need of protection which keeps in motion the whole apparatus of law, both legislation and judiciary. Here the stimulus has increased both in range and in intensity. It is stronger to-day, for more is at stake. In primitive society it is a day's work only that may be stolen; while now the accumulations of generations are to be protected by law. Its range is largely increased. The chief of a primitive tribe only gives advice which may aid in the settlement of disputes, and

a man has hardly any rights which his neighbour is bound to respect. The individual's rights, with the liberties and the duties which they imply, are even to-day increasing rapidly in the highest civilisations we know; and there is a corresponding increase in what society may undertake in securing to the individual his rights. Apart from all question as to the proper fields of state activity, the functions of the police and of the courts in the mere exercise of protection are many-fold greater than they were two or three centuries ago in civilised Europe. The whole range of political activity goes back to the simple need of protection for its fundamental stimulus.

This is not the place to trace in detail the emotions which at all times have determined man's attitude toward his fellows. But while these emotions have not resulted in definite social institutions, their influence has been felt as an aid or a hindrance in all forms of activity, and in the development of all kinds of institutions. From the standpoint of sociological investigations, they may naturally be divided into two classes: the self-regarding, such as envy and anger; and those which centre on others—sympathy, friendship, and love.

The conditions of primitive society favoured the development of self-regarding emotions, and did not supply the checks which in later times have restrained their operation. Egoism is a

universal attitude among savage races, and in many countries the strained effort to procure sustenance does not permit man to forget himself. Anger, not being subject to the restraints of later times, seems to be only destructive of justice; but anger becomes revenge, and, historically revenge is the strong tap-root of what is to become justice. Envy and rivalry generally seem to be destructive of the slow-growing habits of civilisation. Envy of another's prosperity is a motive to slay him, until the prosperous man comes to fear even the envy of the gods. Rivalry between two tribes has often prolonged their feuds until both were crippled. And yet the activity produced by these stimuli has frequently been the very thing necessary for progress; for unless this or some other equally potent force had roused men from the inertia of the savage, and had broken the habit which had become a barrier to progress, a tribe would have fallen a victim to the very progress it had made in the past.

As civilization has advanced, the destructive effects of anger and revenge have been in a measure controlled. Justice is supposed to have passed beyond the stage of vigilance committees and lynching. None the less, the arm of justice still depends on a righteous anger to stimulate its action, and it is only the coward who does not resent an insult. To-day rivalry and ambition

are forces mighty to determine the lives of men and the course of society. Business life and political life are ruled by the desire to succeed; scholars and artists pursue knowledge and art for their own personal ends; and too often the highest forms of activity are marred by most petty jealousies. So the love of acquisition, vanity and the love of display, the love of praise, the whole test of self-regarding emotions, are stimuli to social activity; and the current of social life is directed by the feelings of individuals.

It is unnecessary to dwell on the importance of sympathy and the love of companionship as stimuli to social activity. In their lowest form they are manifested as sympathetic fear and sympathetic pleasure; a group of men share the fear of one, or the glad state of one is infectious and determines the mood of all. The faculty of imitation is related to this form of sympathy; we all have a tendency to act out what we think and what we see others doing, so that modes of action as well as feelings tend to spread through the group. Important as this instinctive sympathy is in uniting the primitive group and rendering it homogeneous, it is very far from the distinctly human love of companionship. The higher forms of friendship depend on personality, and personality is developed in society. The lower love of

companionship manifests itself to-day in the club, and in many of the forms of activity known as "polite society." Friendship and love are higher developments of this emotion, and unite smaller groups in a closer, more permanent, union.

Besides these general sympathetic emotions there are others, more or less closely associated with the sexual instinct, which have as their object particular individuals. This class of emotions is by far the most direct stimulus to social activity, for it results in the family. The extent of the social group thus formed varies widely and its character changes with its extent. It may consist of but two, who find special delight in each other's society. Among animals as well as among men, it includes also the offspring, for the young must be protected and fed. Finally, the family clan may include all who believe they are descended from common parentage. The clan based on blood-relationship has quite generally preceded the tribe as the conserver of culture and the administrator of justice, so that the tie of blood has opened the way for various and most important social activities.

The emotions connected with the sexual instincts are but the starting-point for the unity of the family, for the individuals who are thus brought together enter into new and broader relations. The family proper constitutes a unit

in which the different members perform different functions for the good of the whole. The "parental instinct," fostered by dependent children, increases indefinitely the power of the stimuli to economic and political activity already considered. The new relations of the family are the most powerful stimulus impelling man to look beyond the present and provide for emergencies in the future; and they are also a stimulus impelling him to look above the present. The family develops the habit of providence and the habit of progress. In every stage of social development family interests are the strongest stimulus to activity for the good of others. Brother is ready to die for brother, or the mother for her child, long before duties to a man as a man are recognised. Nor is there ever any stronger motive to the sacrifices of self for another than the love that is developed in the family. As civilisation advances, family life gains in power as a stimulus to social activities. Every thing pure and noble centres in the home, and the relations of the family are the truest stimulus to the higher forms of activity, the intellectual, the moral, and the religious, activities.

The non-essential or derived stimuli to social activity differ from those already discussed in that they are not so universal, and that their power seem to be due in large measure to



civilisation itself. They exist only for men and for societies which have developed the faculty of reason. In a highly developed state of society they may far exceed the lower stimuli in power, and even become the basis of society.

The aesthetic desires of man, his love of the beautiful which is satisfied only by the perception of beautiful things, are important stimuli to social activity. The sense of the beautiful is developed in society, and remains a social possession. The desire to express ideals in forms of sense, and to make beautiful objects, leads to much social activity. The creation of ideals requires a knowledge of the deepest problems of life, and obliges the artist to be in a large sense a social man. He must be in touch with life, or his work will not be living. While the stimulus comes from the deep appreciation of truth, the form in which the ideal is seen and in which it may be expressed is no private possession. The artist must find artist companions; the effort to create what is beautiful leads to peculiar types of social activity and of social classes.

The power to appreciate beautiful objects is also a social possession, and stimulates social activity. Beautiful paintings and the products of plastic art cannot be fully known except by those who go over the civilized world to see them face to face. Yet to-day the dissemination

of accurate reproductions has become a very important industry in itself. The drama is written for an audience to share. Music shows its real power when it makes a thousand hearers as one man, and takes full possession of his soul. A share in the same ideals, whatever be the form of their expression, produces new intimacies among individuals, and new social groups are directly formed as the result.

The reaction of this love of the beautiful on the stimuli already considered cannot be overlooked. These desires presuppose the satisfaction of the lower needs before they have a real opportunity to assert their power. Accordingly, the cultivation of these higher needs is the most vital stimulus to satisfy lower needs, and, as it were, to set them aside. Two results have been noted from the attempt to introduce art education among the lower classes in England. (V. Bosanquet, *Essays and Addresses*, London, 1891.) In the first place, even moderate success has resulted in a most powerful stimulus to shake off habits of poverty and inertia. Men who could make time for the satisfaction of higher needs, received first the necessary encouragement to do this. And, secondly, the recognition of the ideal in forms of sense has at times, even as Plato suggests, opened men's eyes for the higher truth in some of its other forms. Any genuine love of the beautiful modifies the whole of life.

Men's intellectual needs are no small factor in determining the character and intensity of social life. The strength of these needs is shown by the institutions for the propagation of truth, by institutions for investigation, and by the intellectual intercourse to which they give rise. The first class of institutions include the school, the platform, and the press. They exist simply to satisfy man's need of truth, and of a mind developed to know the truth. We believe that the child should start in life with a certain mental equipment ; and the needs thus developed are a constant stimulus to intellectual intercourse, else they would be hardly worth developing. The second class of institutions express this need in a yet stronger form. The scholar studies for himself, because the spirit within him can only be satisfied by a constantly enlarging view of truth. And he studies for society ; the intellectual world awaits the communication of his discoveries. Every advance in literature or in science widens man's interests, and strengthens his need of truth. Society, in both the lower and higher forms of its activity, is profoundly affected by this stimulus.

It is unnecessary to treat in detail the need of moral approval and the need of moral association, or the need of religious communion as stimuli to social activity. In some finely constituted minds the sense of right and

duty seems to be the only spring of activity. Apparently, they can dispense with the stimulus due to any lower need, and even with the support to be drawn from communion with a higher power. The friendship based on love for the same moral ideals is one of the highest, purest, forms of friendship. The power of moral ideals to stimulate and control social life, is shown almost as clearly in the lower as in the higher stages of society. So man's need of religious communion with God, and religious association with his fellows, has always brought men together in common worship of God. The power of this motive is evident only when all the influence of culture and all the authority of the state have been exerted to prevent its normal expression in religious activity. But when it is allowed to develop in normal religious life, the institutions to which it gives rise and their influence on every side of social life, are a constant evidence of its social importance. Like the moral ideal, but with a more personal appeal, the religious need claims the right to absorb all the others and to stamp its impress on them. It so governs and controls the whole of life, that the history of religion may almost claim to be the history of society.

To these various stimuli affecting the individuals who compose society is due the life and activity of society. Two things are clear

as the result of this discussion. First, the life of society centres in individuals, and these two factors, society and individuals, can only be understood by studying them as interacting factors. Secondly, the different forms of social activity, and the different social aggregates arising in each form, should be classified according to the simple stimuli to which each form of activity is due.

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## CHAPTER VI

### THE MODES OF SOCIAL ACTIVITY

The student desiring to understand the complex life of society and the lines of its development, finds himself in difficulty at the outset, because of the confused variety of phenomena that present themselves to him. The first work of the new science of society, the classification of social phenomena, has not yet been done with any success. Earlier writers spoke of family, church, and state as the fundamental social units; for Comte, the individual, the family and "society" are the social organs; and Spencer would classify social activities and institutions according to the three "systems" of organs found in the higher animals. Frequently these classifications have involved the logical error of division according to more than one principle; but, apart from logical blunders, students of society have conspicuously failed to agree on any one classification, and this failure to agree on some common foundation has proved almost fatal to any real progress in the science.

The scientific value of a true classification lies not so much in its convenience, or in its

function as the basis of any successful union among students—important though these undoubtedly are—as in the fact that it represents in itself the fundamental relations of the phenomena under consideration. Almost any sort of classification serves the former purpose to some extent, but the theory of evolution has wrought a great change in the logic of natural science, by demonstrating that there is one really natural method of classification. If organisms of different species have sprung from one common stock, the genetic relation between them, wherever it can be discovered, determines the true, the natural classification. The evolution of social activities and social institutions bears a considerable resemblance to the evolution of organisms; and if complex social phenomena can be traced back to a few simple sources, it will give the key to the genetic classification which a natural science seeks.

It has been shown already that man's needs and emotions were the causes of social activity and that these stimuli to social life were comparatively simple and easily classified. Following this clue, we can give without hesitation the classification of social activities according to the stimuli from which they spring in the following four groups: (1) Economic, (2) Social (including domestic), (3) Political (including legal), (4) Psychical. Social groups arise in the

performance of definite social activities, and the most important bond of union consists of their common function; consequently, the principle for the classification of social activities is at the same time the principle for the classification of social groups. And social institutions, as we hope to show in the present and following discussion, are in reality *habits* of some phase of social activity; their influence extends far beyond the activities in which they arise, but they are classified according to the same principle as the forms of social activity. Finally, the complex forms of social activity can more easily be reduced to the simple forms from which they are derived, when the student is guided by the principle that has been stated. In this way we can hope to reach a classification of social phenomena that is final for the present state of our knowledge, a classification that will prove the basis for common study of social life and the starting point for a more complete understanding of social life.

The fundamental mode of social activity is the *economic* or industrial. The need of food, which man shares with the animal; the need of protection against cold and wet, on which life itself depends; and all the various modifications of these simple needs, which were considered in the preceding chapter, are the sources of this activity. It is as universal as are the simple



needs of human nature, though its influence on other forms of social life is no doubt very different in crabbed northern climates from what it is in prolific lands near the equator. In the lowest forms of society which we can conceive—if indeed we can call it society—these needs cannot lead to any definite and lasting social activity. They are indeed present in full power; but each individual or social group satisfies them as best as it may; one eats the food he gets, and wears the skins he has prepared, but the economic form of social life hardly exists as yet. There is no *value*, for exchange has not begun; no wealth, for each individual or clan simply satisfies its own needs without coming into comparison with any one else; true social life, really human life, exists only in germ.

When circulation intervenes between the production of what satisfies want, and its immediate consumption, it is possible to speak of a true economic activity of society. The simple bond of exchange unites men at first rarely and for a brief moment, then more regularly and more permanently, in a common activity for the satisfaction of economic needs. The stimulus still acts on individuals, but it leads them to work together, till all that each one does must be considered from the social standpoint as part of the industrial activity of society. The needs are still universal, and the resulting social

activity embraces the whole of society. No one escapes from it, for no one is free from the need of food and clothing; no one can really isolate himself from the social activity that meets these needs, for the industrial activity of society is modified by the attitude of each individual toward it. The social activity resulting from economic needs, then, is co-extensive with society, and every individual has his place in the economic or industrial life of society.

The economic mode of social activity develops simultaneously in three phases, which are commonly known as production, circulation, and consumption. The special science dealing with economic phenomena naturally considers these phases in the above order. It studies the production of goods, and traces them from their economic origin to their economic end.

The science of society is concerned not with goods but with persons, so that it treats the subject in a different order. In the history of culture, wealth begins with exchange, not with production; it is the circulation of commodities which first unites individuals or groups in a common activity that deserves the name economic. For sociology, circulation is the fundamental fact; consumption, or the working of the economic motives, the second fact to be considered; chronologically, as well as logically, production is to be considered last.

Circulation is based on the fact that men are different; different in their nature and capacities, and different in their surroundings. The needs of any one are most easily met when several unite, each to supply what he is best able, to this end. Historically the supply of such a mineral as salt, or the possession of a good fishing-ground, or some other abundant source of food, commonly furnished the motive to meet the want of other things by exchange. So soon as society was stable enough to permit the development of further differences in skill, the range of exchange was much widened. Exchange, the circulation of goods, is the fundamental form of economic activity. It determines the limits of an economic society, and the structure of a larger economic group is mainly due to this phase of its common activity.

The second phase of economic activity is ordinarily called "consumption." The "consumption of goods" means for the economist the obtaining of goods from a market, and the devoting of them to the satisfaction of the want or desire which they were intended to satisfy. The importance of this branch of economics to the sociologist is due to the fact that here is the point where the economic stimuli find their application in producing economic activity. Economically it is the "desire to consume" that leads men to exchange what they possess,

to produce for the purpose of exchange, and thus to obtain what they need. The study of the needs men feel, and the degree to which they feel them, is the direct key to an understanding of the particular forms of economic activity.

Thirdly, economic activity is to be studied from the standpoint of production. Production for a market is the direct result of the utility of exchange ; men undertake to meet a market demand when that is the surest way of meeting their own needs. The possibility of the development of exchange, and of economic consumption lies just here ; as production for a market develops and controls industrial life, circulation increases its range, and economic solidarity results from the increasing dependence of each individual on the society in which he lives his industrial life. The production of the goods men use is so much more of an affair than the exchange of goods or their consumption, that naturally the organisation of society for production, the so-called industrial organisation in the stricter sense of the term, sets its mark on all economic activity, and indeed on all the life of society.

The three phases of economic activity must be considered in another chapter more in detail in order to understand their development and their social importance. At this point it is desirable to emphasise the fact that economic

stimuli cause an economic activity of society, embracing all of society, because the needs in question exist for every individual. Economic activity appears in three phases and in each phase particular groups are formed to perform particular functions—in each phase special institutions arise to meet special needs. The economic group like other social groups, is to be understood only from the standpoint of its function in the universal economic life of a society. The economic institution is in reality a habit of economic activity, and it accomplishes even more in facilitating and extending this activity than do the habits of the individual man, out of which grows his entire power to accomplish the ends he sets before him.

The economic life of society proceeds from a few definite sources, and continues to depend on springs of activity that are not difficult to analyse ; it can be studied by itself, as is proved by the existence of a science of economics. And yet it does not exist by itself, it is so closely interlinked with the “social” and domestic organisation of society, that neither the “social” nor the economic organisation of society can be truly explained when they are studied alone. Political influences favour or hinder economic development ; the state rests back on the industrial life that a people has developed. Psychical life arises as an offshoot of the common life by

which man's simplest needs are met, and at length supplies new motive and wiser direction to economic activity. In a word, economic activity springs from definite motives, and so it may be studied by itself; but these motives are so interlaced with a variety of other motives in the man himself, that no one form of the activity in which he engages can be said to exist independently or can be understood independently.

The second general standpoint from which the activity of society may be studied, deserves the name *social* in a special sense. All of society, as we have seen, falls into economic classes and has an economic life; similarly all of society falls into social classes, classes for closer social intercourse, and such intercourse constitutes its distinctly social life. This social life also has its own peculiar stimuli, namely, the emotions which draw a man to one neighbour, and repel him from another. The domestic life which results from these emotions, together with the emotions associated with the sexual and the parental instinct, is but one form of the general social life of the community. In fact, the family life is not directly included in what is known as "society," for in the close union of home life, members of the family easily lose that peculiar stimulus which comes from the contact of minds that contribute something new and fresh to each

other in conversation. In broader social intercourse the mind is forcibly lifted out of common ruts, and quickened by new ideas and new points of view; the desire for this new life gives rise to the distinctly social activity of society, and in this activity social groups are formed and social institutions arise.

While there is usually some likeness to begin with among those who join in social intercourse, their associated life can but result in a growing assimilation. The social group is a nursery of common habits, and it is these habits or customs which distinguish the group with increasing clearness from other allied groups. The common customs constitute the character of the group; they may become the key of admission, since those who have the habits which distinguish a particular class are easily received into the common activity of that class. Herein lies the value of rules of etiquette and ceremonial forms, for unless such forms facilitate social intercourse and bind men together in social classes, they are worse than useless. A more important characteristic of these social groups is the social ideals, ideals of politeness, of accessibility, liberality, and respect for others, which are developed in this social intercourse. Of these social groups the family is the only one which has become really definite and fixed. The social club, and all the "associations" and "societies"

of the present day, utilize the social desires, but frequently their main end is not distinctly social. The classes in what is generally known as society, or polite society, are the real groups for "social" life; and the "social scale" is one name for the social structure of a community.

The customs and conventions which mark the social group may be described as habits of activity in the social organism. They are a social fact, though their point of application is the individual. The rise and fall of custom, and the authority of custom, constitute the most important question of social evolution; it concerns the very nature of the group which becomes the proper unit of society. In developed society the line is not always sharply drawn between social duties and excellences on the one hand, and moral duties and ideals on the other. Religious requirements, moral rules, laws enforced by the state and customs enforced by social sanction, have sprung from the same root; the differentiation of these requirements and their respective sanctions has not been fully accomplished even yet. The character of social life, and the material or content of custom, is undoubtedly determined by the degree of civilisation. Social life may, perhaps, begin as a mere animal gregariousness; with the reign of physical force, a rude political character may distinguish social life; when



economic interests are foremost, social intercourse will bear an industrial stamp ; the school and the press mean that social intercourse has risen to the intellectual plane, and the church, that such intercourse may rise to the religious plane.

The relation of the distinctly social activity of the community to its psychical life is clear from the preceding discussion ; the intellectual, and the moral, and the religious life of a community are largely specializations of this social life. Accordingly, where a genuine social life is vigorous and intense, conditions favour the development of the psychical life. In like manner, this social activity lies at the basis of political activity. The race, *i.e.*, those who regard themselves as related to each other by reason of their common language, common customs, etc., is a social development ; and the nation always tends to become coincident with the race. The rules enforced by the power of the state are not different in kind ; often they do not differ in origin from the rules of custom which "society" enforces by its own peculiar sanction. Social activity is as universal and as fundamental as economic activity. Association in industrial pursuits both presupposes the faculty of association, and largely assists in developing this faculty. Social customs are a great bulwark of industry to render the industrial world stable ; social classes and industrial classes so far correspond, that the two relations work

together in harmony to produce a fuller and richer common life within the group.

The third form of social activity, according to the above classification, is the *political*. The stimulus to which this form of activity is due, is the need of protection, and the fear of hostile powers. This stimulus has assumed a double form. It includes first the need of protection for the political group as a whole, and leads to the organisation of society in such wise as to protect the tribe or the state from the incursion or attack by other political groups. It includes also the need of protection within the tribe itself, and this leads to the recognition of such individual rights, and the development of such restraining laws as best conduce to the unity and strength of the whole body. Accordingly, the political activity of society is the constant readjustment of the government to new internal conditions, and the adjustment of the state's military and diplomatic service to new external conditions. The various and complex forms which this activity assumes, centre in one all-embracing institution, the state. This topic is so important that the discussion of it is deferred to a separate place; and inasmuch as political activity and political structure really form one question, they will be discussed together. At this point, it only remains to speak of the relation of the political activity of society to the other forms of social activity.

In a sense, the political life of a society may be regarded as the outcome of all the various forms of social activity and the focus in which they meet. The nation has often seemed the most perfect social unit, and sociology has been described as a political science, or even as the political science. In time past, the industrial market has frequently coincided with the nation; the idea of humanity has been limited by the confines of the race and the nation, so that social life, and all the higher psychical life, were but phases of the people's national life. A state is no longer coincident with society, but industry continues to depend on the state for the protection of those who engage in it; common political interests are a powerful factor in the social world; while the protection of a strong government is necessary for the higher developments of psychical life, and the type of government always reacts on the character of the moral and intellectual life.

Finally, the activity of society may be studied as a psychical activity. The stimuli to which this activity is due—aesthetic, intellectual, moral and religious needs—have been already described as the non-essential or derived stimuli. The love of the beautiful and the desire to enjoy beautiful things produce the aesthetic activity of society, the activity which arises in connection with the production and the appreciation of beautiful

things. It gives rise to institutions such as the schools of art, in which a master's habits descend to his pupils and perhaps open the way for new creative masters; schools in which lovers of beauty are trained to see the beautiful in particular forms and under particular conditions. These institutions are simply habitual ways in which the master creates, and his audience appreciates, the expression of beauty. They are social habits.

Similarly, the need of intellectual intercourse, and the desire to know the truth, is the stimulus to the intellectual activity of society. This intellectual activity follows habitual modes, and thus gives rise to the institutions for intellectual intercourse which were mentioned in the last chapter. The platform and the press are such institutions for the spread of truth, while the university is intended to be an institution for research. But the intellectual activity of society is by no means limited to institutions of this sort, for it enters as one element into all social intercourse. Indeed, differences in the degree and character of intellectual training, are one of the most important factors in the differentiation of social classes.

The sense for beauty and the desire for truth are social facts. The truth that has been attained and that finds expression in science and philosophy, and in art, does not belong to any one

individual, but to society. Not only the desire to know the truth, but the very power to recognise what is true, is developed in society and is a social possession. A Raphael and a Beethoven perceived the beautiful which their ages sought to grasp, and brought it to expression. Bacon and Newton and Faraday had that creative genius which could formulate the scientific truth to which their respective ages were advancing. The intellect does indeed centre in the individual, but individuality itself develops as a product of the intellectual activity of society.

The psychical activity of society includes also the moral life which springs from the need of moral approval and moral association. This moral life expresses itself first in the form of certain rules, which have been differentiated from the customs that mark the social groups. Custom is enforced by the group and within the group, as the distinguishing characteristic of this body. A custom becomes a moral rule when it is regarded as universally binding, as necessary to society, as a whole, and so enforced by society as a whole. The observance of this custom is a duty, and any one who neglects it is condemned by society. It goes without saying that this transformation of custom into conscious rule is a gradual process, in which men of fine sense discern the right before their fellows, and can but slowly extend

and purify the rules of right action. This process is the slowly developing moral life of society and the "institutions" which arise in connection with it are known as duties. The moral life expresses itself also in moral ideals. Ideals are a social fact; the ideals which men create for themselves are proposed to them by the social group. Noble intellects are trained by society to perceive the high ends which give to life its meaning, and through them these ideals are developed; they are produced in society, as well as a social possession. We can never forget that morality centres in the individual and aims to control his life; nor should we forget that morality is a form of social life, a habit of the social group.

Almost universally in human society men have felt the need of communion with a God, and this has led to a religious activity of society. New rules of right and new ideals, closely associated with moral rules and moral ideals, arise through the introduction of a new factor, relation to God. The social nature of these rules and ideals is evident from the redistributions of society which they have always caused. The history of religion discusses the institutions of sacrifice and purification, of churches and priesthoods, through which this religious activity has found expression. These institutions are the particular forms assumed by this kind of social activity;

they are habits which characterise social groups, and give rise to social groups. Religion centres in the individual, and stands for the relation of an individual to his God; but the character of this relation is determined by society, and preserved in society. Neither religious reformers nor students of religious thought have failed to see the importance of religious fellowship in arousing and developing the individual's sense of relation to God. The religious life finds its normal expression in the church and, at least in theory, no social group is so closely knit together as is the church in its common love and common worship of God; nor does any form of social activity claim such a comprehensive authority over all of life. Those who reduce the church to the place of a voluntary association, fail to see either its religious or its social meaning.

[To avoid any misapprehension, we may state the definition of the *science* of sociology; as a science sociology studies processes, and explains the manner in which forms of psychical life arise in society, but it is not concerned with the origin or ultimate meaning of what it explains. So it studies religion and explains the manner in which it arises, but it neither denies nor affirms the real existence of God. The Christian student sees the working of the divine hand, not in religion alone, but in all the forms of

social activity; the religious life of society depends on God's revelation of himself, in exactly the same way in which all social life is the working out of God's plans.]

Inasmuch as the true unity of society is psychical rather than physical, it is evident that all forms of social activity find their goal and their true explanation in the distinctly psychical activity of society. An industrial class becomes a society only when its members come to share the same psychical life; directly such a development of psychical bonds makes the industrial class more stable, until sometimes its fixedness stands in the way of progress; indirectly, the development of these higher forms of activity brings more potent stimuli to bear on the economic life and lends to the economic structure of society that general stability which gradually unites those who share the same type of higher civilisation. And with the progress of civilisation, social and political life come to feel the same influences. The groups which are united in these forms of activity are at length determined rather by psychical differences than by any external law; the social and the political structure become at the same time more complex and more stable by the growth of higher bonds of union; while the presence of the highest ends and the highest motives may place the lower forms of social life on an entirely new plane.



With reference to all the modes of social activity discussed here, it is important to bear in mind two points: (1) Each of these modes of activity is due to stimuli acting on the individual mind, and each finds its expression in individuals ; and (2) they are distinctly forms of *social* activity, in which men are united in social groups or societies, while institutions are simply social habits arising in connection with these forms of activity.

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## CHAPTER VII

### INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION OF SOCIETY

The economic activity of society has been defined as the activity due to man's fundamental physical needs, the need of food and of clothing. Economic life develops, as we have seen, in the three phases of circulation, consumption, and production ; and the discussion of industrial organisation and industrial institutions naturally follows this threefold division. It is the more necessary to treat industrial organisation from this threefold standpoint, for the three phases of activity do not develop simultaneously, nor do they have a co-ordinate influence on other modes of social activity. In general, the forms of production are so important as to determine the general character of the industrial organisation. The history of labour is part of the study of production ; tools and machinery are the instruments of production ; the stages of industrial development are marked by the development of methods and implements of production. At the same time, production can hardly be termed a form of economic activity till circulation intervenes and goods are produced for a market ;

and the motive for production is always found in the desire to "consume."

The history of man's nascent industrial life has ordinarily been written either as an account of the stone, and the bronze, and the iron ages—according to the material of which the implements are made—or as an account of the hunting and fishing stage, the nomad stage, and the industrial stage of economic development—according to the main source of food. The former may be termed the archaeological, the latter the ethnological, standpoint for the study of primitive man. The earliest historical traces of man, found in many parts of the earth, are the stone implements which he used. The rude stone club, the chipped flint that served as spear-head or as knife are to be dated back to geologic ages, when the climate and the flora and fauna of the temperate zone, were very different from what they are at present. The gradual development of the club into the hammer, the hatchet, and the adze; of the chipped flint into the sharpened arrowhead, the polished knife, and chisel; of the hollowed stone into the bowl, and at length into the mill for grinding corn; the gradual development of these stone implements can be traced in the fragments that have come down to us, and it throws much light on the dawning reason which absolutely separated man from the other animals.

The use of metal, bronze or iron, marks another distinct stage in early forms of industry. The metal knife or sword, the metal hatchet, are far superior to the best instruments of stone; and the bowl or cup of beaten metal, would come to be always used, were it not for the invention of pottery which partly took the place of metal. No sharp line separates the bronze and the iron ages; but when iron came to be smelted and worked with reasonable ease, the possibilities of metal tools were much increased and their cost diminished.

The social importance of the development of tools lies in two directions. First, tools increase the range and variety, and consequently the regularity, of the food supply. The use of the bone fish-hook and of the net means a new source of food; the arrow from a bow is a surer and swifter than the best spear or lance; fire gains much more general use in the preparation of food, when water can be boiled in pottery or metal vessels. Secondly, tools enable man better to secure himself against attacks of hostile beasts and hostile men. Almost every tool is also a weapon; and the tool-making, tool-using animal is in the end superior to the animal that has itself the greater strength or speed. It is not so much the security of the individual, as the security of small societies, that is gained by the use of better weapons,

The small group secures a measure of permanence by its ability to defend itself against the world, and the foundations of political and industrial society are laid.

The development of tools has this farther effect on the beginnings of industrial organization, that it encourages the differentiation of industrial activity. The original difference between the sexes has always remained the basis of social differentiation, but even this difference was made more marked by tools which busied the husband abroad, or gave wider range to what the wife should do at home. Again, not every man could make tools that required skill, and some would use one implement better than another. At length the small group of tool-users, the tribe or the village unit, would be a more compact unit because the different members depended on each other for the satisfaction of the common economic needs.

The ethnologist is wont to view early economic history in a slightly different light. He finds the more backward races of mankind depending on different sources of food. Some depend for food on game, other on their flocks and herds, other still on their yearly crops. Agriculture surely goes along with a higher social life than is ordinarily found among hunting or nomad peoples, and the custom has arisen of referring to the three means of satisfying

economic needs, as three stages of economic development. The view is only in part correct, but it suggests the very great importance of the source of food (and clothing) in determining the industrial organisation of a society.

In different parts of the American continent are found tribes that depend mainly on game for food, all the way from the lowest savagery up to the very verge of civilisation. The effect of this mode of subsistence on social life varies, of course, with the abundance and regularity of the supply of game, but in general it produces societies of much the same type. The size of the group is necessarily limited, except where waters bring large shoals of fish within easy reach of the fisherman. Ordinarily, only a very scanty population could be supported; and in cases where a tribe became large, it all but fell apart of itself, as its members travelled far in search of food. And these economic conditions do not especially favour the intercourse of different tribes, for the presence of the hunter in the domain of another tribe inevitably suggests trespass. Again, this form of "industry" favoured strongly an unsettled life. A fixed village was possible, and even common in some part of the Western half of the continent, but more commonly the so-called Indian village was a sort of rendezvous where he settled at certain seasons of the year.

In consequence of the roving life, the basis of the state was simply and only the ties of blood and custom, and the higher forms of social life had little or no opportunity of development. The manner of life of the successful hunter encouraged the virtues and excellencies of the individual. His own power to read nature and understand animals, his own cunning in outwitting them, his own endurance in their pursuit, these made the hunter an independent man by nature. Independence and individuality, thus developed, affected the whole range of social life, and made the state entirely democratic in its character.

On the American continent examples of nomad life are rare, because there were so few animals that proved suited for domestication. But in Asia and in many parts of Africa, not only the dog and the hen, but soon cattle and goats and sheep were domesticated, and furnished man with a far more abundant and more regular supply of food than could be secured by hunting. The Hebrew accounts of shepherds in Palestine perhaps furnish the most familiar picture of the nomad life. Used for keeping flocks, the same area produced much more food for man, so that the population of nomad races became correspondingly denser than in the case of races living on game alone. This mode of life did not favour the individualism of the

hunter's life, for no one man could keep cattle alone to good advantage. Groups of moderate size, which could care for their common herds and protect them together, were naturally best suited for this kind of life. So we find now the small clan, now the large family, living on the products of the herd that they owned and kept in common. The necessity of protection for property demanded a much more highly developed political life ; and as different clans lived in closer proximity, the intercourse between them would commonly be more active. Before the cultivation of grass as a crop, the life of nomad peoples was unsettled, as they wandered in search of food for their herds ; so that, in spite of the more developed social life, the same obstacle to a higher development of culture continued to exist.

Returning again to North America, we find that tobacco and " Indian corn " were widely cultivated by tribes that still depended largely on game for food, while in Africa and Asia both hunting races and nomad races turned to agriculture for a better supply of food. Cattle could be maintained better, and in larger numbers, when the natural supply of grass was increased by artificial care. The cereals were more easily stored for long periods and furnished food when other sources failed. Moreover, agriculture permitted a far denser population than



could have been maintained before, and people could live in closer quarters. Agriculture generally deserves to be regarded as the beginning of civilisation. It required a settled life, and permitted life in considerable towns ; it required such political life as would grant ample protection to large areas of crops in the fields ; it was most successful when such social differentiation existed as permitted the utilisation of slave labour to prosecute the cultivation of the soil with regularity and persistence. In a word, it required civilised life before it could be undertaken, and it furnished strong motives to higher civilisation.

The most marked feature of the change from the hunting stage and the nomad stage to the agricultural stage, is the great increase in the differentiation of labour. In the hunting stage all men are theoretically equal, though differences of age, strength, and skill actually introduce some differences in their pursuits. The nomad life encourages the formation of small groups, in which one person is master, if no owner, while several others care for the flocks and the products of the flocks under his direction. In such a large family, household, or clan, the skill of one as carpenter or tent maker, of another in preparing the rude utensils of their simple life, of others in other lines, would be utilised under the direction of the master,

even while all united in the regular business of caring for the flocks. With the development of agriculture, and the consequent increase in size of the social group, the occasional differentiation of function becomes a true differentiation of the labourers. When agriculture was no longer a sporadic method of eking out the food-supply but the normal and regular source of food, the village community arose as the natural form of social organisation. These communities, which mark the point to which the social life of civilised states can be traced back with any assurance, consisted of groups of families or clans, each of which was organised much like the group of nomad life, though on a smaller scale. Each family, or clan, cultivated its share of the fields of the community under the direction of its head—but the heads of families were subject in turn to the chief of the village, and oftentimes further differences of rank existed. The work of the house carpenter, and the cartwright, and the smith, was frequently the lot of particular individuals, who were in part supported from the fruit of the other's labour; and while all the women might spin and weave, such arts as dyeing and special ornamentation would often be carried on by one or two in behalf of the whole community. Some men, ing their connection with any one com- would engage in commerce, bringing

precious metals and jewels, fancy clothes, important minerals like salt, etc., from place to place. Such seems to have been the industrial organisation of the early community, which developed into the town or city and the larger state.

The farther study of industrial organisation, industrial institutions, and their social importance, necessarily follows the three-fold division according to which industrial activity develops. Beginning, therefore, with the subject of circulation or exchange, we recall the fact that this is really the beginning of the particular form of social activity which deserves the name economic. It is the idea of exchange, and somewhat regular exchange, which characterises economic activity as such. The general type of the early merchant still exists in the case of bold adventurers who set forth into the wilds of Africa, it may be; they provide themselves with gay cloths and other products of civilisation that please the savage, hold a sort of market as they reach some savage tribe, and return at length with the stores of ivory and spices and perhaps slaves which they have gained by barter. As soon as visits of this sort come to be expected with any regularity, so that the savage prepares a stock of goods for the trader, genuine economic activity has begun on the basis of an occasional market. The next step toward a higher

development of exchange is when a market, or fair, is held regularly at some definite place to which both buyers and sellers come. The Church feasts of the middle ages furnished such regular occasions for exchange, and gave the name "*Messe*" to the fairs that originated at times when mass was celebrated. The influence of the great annual fairs, at which all wholesale and most of the retail trade was conducted, has hardly disappeared in England, and is still very important on the continent. Gradually the advantage of regular posts of trade, open and accessible at all times, has been recognised; and the "shop" or "store" has taken the place of recurring markets as the ordinary method of exchange.

In the process of exchange, two institutions arise which are very important objects of study for the science which deals with economic phenomena in detail. The first of these is the institution of money. Exchange is immensely facilitated by the use of some recognised standard of value. What the standard is, of course, depends largely on the relative convenience of the different possible objects; but it takes its place as the standard of value by a sort of social agreement. It is *money* when it is recognised and received as money. When a good standard of value comes into use, the sphere of exchange is indefinitely extended; parties more distant

from each other can enter into commercial relations; and the goods exchanged need not be limited by the present wants of the parties. In fact the standard of value of civilisation penetrates into the distant parts of the earth almost as soon as rum itself. The effect of this unity of the commercial world upon the higher forms of social life can hardly be estimated. Identity of ideas and of tastes is preceded by identity of money.

The second class of institutions arising in the process of exchange have to do with transportation. The amount of goods exchanged at any given time, and the possible range of a market, depend on the facility with which goods are transported. According to Proudhon, "to draw a loaded cart on the natural soil requires one-quarter or one-fifth the energy necessary to carry the weight in question; on good roads in ordinary condition, only .08 of this amount of energy is necessary; on oak rails the figure is reduced to .022; finally, on steel rails in good condition it is only .005 or .003 of the original amount; ..... the increase in distance carried, in rapidity and regularity of transportation, can hardly be estimated." Along with this apparatus for the transportation of merchandise, there has grown up an apparatus for the rapid transportation of intelligence, which is hardly less important in its effect on commerce. The post, which

was originally a military affair, has come to serve primarily an economic purpose. The condition of any important market is made known all over the globe as quickly as in distant parts of the same city, and the London buyer does not have any considerable advantage in time over the New York buyer, when goods are offered for sale in London. Finally, the institutions for the transportation of money have kept pace with the means of transmitting intelligence. Orders on private or governmental banks, which are received as readily as gold, are transmitted by mail or by telegraph and the process of circulation is complete. For the purposes of business, space and time are all but annihilated and the world is made in reality a single market.

War has been the most important external factor in the origin and development of circulation, and this influence has been exerted in two ways. In the first place the earliest collections of goods to be distributed or exchanged, consisted of the booty which a successful band of marauders brought home with them. Military leaders and their followers would desire to exchange the products of war, such as slaves, for the products of peace. And secondly war brought different tribes of people into contact with each other, and opened high ways of communication between them. The world is enlarged, and men learn that their wants and the wants of their neighbours

can be met most easily by exchange. For a strong man, to take a thing may seem the easiest way to get it; but the first and perhaps the longest step in progress, is the recognition that this course is destructive, while fair interchange of goods benefits all the parties concerned. Violence breaks a path for progress, and commerce follows in the track of war.

The first and most important effect of circulation, or the exchange of commodities on the other modes of social activity, is the well-known fact that the circulation of goods always favours the interaction of minds. Intellectual intercourse in its various forms follows commercial intercourse, so that the development of commerce is the immediate precursor of progress. In the settlement of a new country, the school and the church and the court, follow the pioneers of trade. In an older country, the lack of good means of communication results in stagnation; custom is unchanging and the past becomes a barrier to progress instead of the basis of advance. The second effect of a widening commerce on other forms of social life, is the enlargement of the social world along other lines than the purely commercial. The "world" in which we live, the social lives which bound that part of the race to which we feel akin, the psychical life of which we feel ourselves an integral part, the political world, in which our state has its proper sphere

of activity, all of these are enlarged with the enlargement of the commercial world. Civilisation follows commerce into the jungles, through the desert, and toward the poles. Civilisation will touch every part of the globe when trade has opened the way for it. And the third effect of commerce, with its complex bonds now uniting the whole world, is to develop closer and more complex bonds in all other forms of social activity. Economic activity could never have attained its present high development without the aid of political protection, and judicial arbitration and the special restraints, as well as the special stimuli, of the moral code. Conversely, social rank depends on economic conditions; the state is made stable and conservative, as well as progressive by the economic interests which lie at its foundation; the intellectual and the moral unity of society is a gradual achievement, for which the bonds of common economic function ever prepare the way. Men trade together and learn that they are brothers; just as once they fought together and found that there existed other beings than themselves who deserved respect.

The second standpoint from which the economic activity of society may be considered, is also marked by some measure of special organisation, and by an institution of far-reaching importance. Here, as we have seen, is the point



where economic stimuli find their direct application ; men produce that they may exchange their products for what they desire to "consume" ; in other words, the generalised expression for the economic motive is the desire to consume. The orthodox political economy has been wont to solve this whole question very simply, not to say summarily, by postulating an "economic man," a man ruled by the desire for wealth. Undoubtedly, this last expression has meant the desire for what wealth brings, and not simply love of money ; in other words, economics has started out with the important postulate that the units it is to consider, are governed by what it terms a desire to "consume." Such mathematical abstraction has brought with it both clearness and confusion ; clearness in that the motive force of economic life is reduced to a single unit ; confusion in that this unreal abstraction has often been obliged to do duty for the richness of concrete truth.

In fact, the true "economic man" is the product of his age ; his desires change as society develops ; nor is the change unimportant, for the whole face of economic life changes with each change in the units that enter into it. This economic man is the being whose needs and emotions were discussed before, and consumption is simply the use of what is acquired in exchange to satisfy his needs and

emotions. The particular content of man's needs changes entirely with his habit of life. Uncooked flesh is followed by roast or boiled meat as the hunter's diet, while the shepherd lives on the products of the animal—milk, butter, and cheese; vegetable diet changes from nuts and fruits to parched grains and cakes of crushed or ground corn. The need which a given man feels is not the need of food, but rather the need of the flesh or the dish of pottage, by which he has been wont to satisfy hunger; the desire for this particular object governs his action in the effort to acquire it. So the imperativeness of man's needs varies with the stage of social development. The savage goes for days on a most meagre diet, and then when he has game he gorges himself with food. It is only when the torpid sleep after such a feast has lasted for days that reviving hunger drives him to activity once more. But the civilised man requires "three meals a day," and the content of each one is imperatively determined by his social position. Nor is the change in the variety of his needs any less important. Practically the simple demand for nourishment and warmth has been replaced by the complex need of the thousand and one things which constitute the standard of living; a carriage may seem more necessary than bread, sealskin garments more necessary than blankets.

The study of the particular forms which these needs assume, is the source of most valuable light on the economic life of a given age. Such study defines at once the motives to economic activity, and the lines which this activity must follow. Here the student learns to understand the units of economic life, and it is on this basis alone that he can discover the relation of the units in the industrial organisation. The circulation and exchange of commodities, intervening between the production of goods and their immediate consumption, follows man's immediate needs, so far as his needs find social recognition. Production, too, is to meet the market demand for the goods which men call for.

The greatest change in the use to which men put their products, occurs when they begin to store these products for future use, instead of applying them to the satisfaction of immediate desire. The institution of property, to which so much fruitful study has recently been devoted, had humble beginnings and developed but slowly. Its social origin is quite generally admitted. It is probable that property began with articles worn about the person, clothing, amulets, and especially adornments, at a time when even weapons and the simple utensils of cooking were the property of the clan or group. Along with the development of the idea of individuality came important extensions of the idea

of individual property. Weapons and utensils, finally dwelling-places, flocks and herds, were reckoned by the tribe as the property of its individual members, though the members of a family have never lost all claim on the possessions of the head of the family ; these articles became individual property because members of society so reckoned them. After a long period real estate also came to be reckoned as the property of individuals, though still in a somewhat restricted sense, for the state preserves certain rights over its territory.

The social importance of property is universally recognised. It means a new form of consumption, a new use for wealth—goods may be effectively stored. In connection with it there arises a new social stimulus, the love of acquisition. Property means power over one's fellow men, and the love of power is constantly acquiring range as an economic stimulus, while apparently it loses power as a political stimulus. When the idea of property centred in the clan, it helped to make the clan a compact unit. The gradual recognition of individual property was a great power in developing the nascent individualism of the members of the clan. Once developed, the idea of individual property sapped the roots of the clan life ; it was a potent factor in overthrowing the matriarchal family, which was commonly so closely connected with the

clan relationship; it became the basis of the higher type of psychical life. Perhaps its most important social effect has come to be in the fact that the possession of property is so generally the basis of social differentiation. In earlier times physical force, later institutions of caste, were the basis of differentiation in society. To-day, in the stable forms of society, wealth is the most universally recognised source of power, so that social rank is often determined by the possession of wealth.

In the study of industrial organisation, the third phase of economic activity is most important. Beginning within the early social group long before it can be called economic production, it is gradually dominated by the demands of a developing market, until in the modern city, the family finds it possible to give up absolutely every form of domestic production, and rely solely on what an extensive market will furnish. While it is, of course, the development of circulation and exchange which is responsible for so great a change in the character of production, the institution of property which has just been considered, is an indispensable condition. Property previously acquired must be used in production, if it be only to support the producer till he can reap the fruit of his labour in the exchange of his products; capital, property utilised for the production of goods to be

exchanged, is the very basis of economic production, and it is the growth of capital that has made possible the rapid development of industry during the present century.

The institutions by means of which production has been carried on, have varied exceedingly in different ages, and each has been the basis of a particular type of social life. The earliest organisation for this purpose was some form of slavery. Inertia is an almost universal characteristic of savage races; men only work under compulsion, either the compulsion of immediate need, or the compulsion of superior human force—and the effort to satisfy immediate need is so spasmodic that it cannot be utilised for the production of any but the simplest objects. When captives taken in war could be utilised for work instead of being destroyed or eaten, a genuine means of production was secured; and unproductive as slave-labour seems to us, it was immensely more productive than labour to which the only spur was hunger. The early civilisations of the East show what has been accomplished with this means of production; indeed, economic production rested on no other basis in Greece and Rome.

Feudalism marks a decided advance on slavery, for the relation of master and servant was more permanent, and the system required and developed greater ability in the servant. The

serf had certain interests of his own, not wholly identical with his lord's, and his position depended largely on the way in which he cared for these interests. Thus the serf was trained for centuries in the school of partial freedom, till at length the power to work for a future reward was a greater stimulus than external compulsion. Then masters gradually learned that hired labour was more profitable than forced labour, and the principle of serfdom, like the principle of slavery before it, had to give way to a higher form of organisation for production. Naturally the change took place much earlier in the towns than in the country.

Here circumstances favoured the economical independence of the household, provided it paid the dues assessed, and performed the military service required. The household became the unit for production, and it continued to be so until conditions were changed by the introduction of machinery. Often it was necessary for craftsman to unite in guilds to secure their rights. Whether or not he was a member of a guild, the artisan was far enough from real freedom of initiative, nevertheless he was able to work for himself instead of working for another.

In the modern industrial system which has grown up with the introduction of machinery and the consequent organisation of production

in large factories, scarcely a vestige of the formal external restraint remains. Ability to work with vigour, continuity, and skill, is almost the only factor which determines the workman's position in the industrial system; while the relation between employer and employed has been reduced, more and more, to a strictly economic basis. The removal of each phase of external restraint on labour, and the increasing freedom of labourer and employer, have been attended at each stage by a wider differentiation of economic classes so that the industrial world is more complex than ever before.

Each of these forms of industrial organisation is the basis for a particular form of the higher kinds of social activity. Slavery means a sharp line of distinction between master and slave in "social" intercourse; the tribe which keeps slaves has a different political development from the tribe without slaves, and it is just this difference which separates most widely the developed states of antiquity from the modern state; moreover, slavery cultivates certain habits of mind which control the psychological development both of masters and slaves. Under the feudal system an aristocracy of birth determines the lines of "social" intercourse, and gives rise to peculiar social institutions and peculiar social ideals; the feudal state is a confederacy of feudal lords; chivalry is but one



of the peculiar psychical products of the system. Finally, in the present age of industrial freedom, differences in economic capacity are fully developed; the difference between individuals and families tends to increase from generation to generation; yet the dead level of barbarism still remains, so that every advance introduces wider differences into the economic world. Such a society fosters an aristocracy of wealth; political power is in the hands of the third estate; business integrity and habits of hard work are the excellencies most highly prized.

With the economic development of society, the peculiar character of the economic group has been growing more and more distinct, until to-day the economic ideal is exerting a great influence on the character of other social groups. The economic group proper is not marked by any real solidarity of life and interest, rather it has tended to drift away from this general solidarity as it has become distinct. Competition is commonly represented as the basis of modern industrial society, and competition involves free circulation of labour. The ideal of economic relationship is free association, that is, the group in economic life is composed of men who unite in common activity because they recognise that their interests are identical, and who feel entirely free to leave the group as soon as their economic

interests diverge. The labourer is bound to his master by no tie except such as he voluntarily assumes; he has all the rights and all the responsibility which belong to an independent economic unit. The trade union has only served to emphasise the independence of the individual labourer by lending to each one the strength which comes from association. Attempts have, indeed, been made to bind individuals together in more permanent unions for economic purposes, as in the case of profit sharing and co-operative societies, but they have been sporadic, and they have met with no lasting success. The ideal of the economic group is the absolute *economic* freedom of both master and labourer; although the human interest that binds every man to those who become his neighbours, cannot fail to lend its sanction to the group united by economic interests.

Historically it may be questioned whether the individualistic view of life, which is becoming clearly the characteristic of the economic man, had its origin in economic relations. Practically, however, no fervid preaching of the rights of the individual had been so powerful to affect society down to its very foundations as the constant enforcing of the rights and responsibility of the individual in the industrial life of this industrial age. It tends to break down the old "social" relations, and even marriage is regarded as

a temporary contract rather than the beginning of a common life. The democratic state is made little more than a "social contract," and the university and even the church are often regarded as associations of the economic type in another sphere of common life. The cause of this abnormal influence of the economic ideals is to be found in the present abnormal development of industrial interests, and it can only be remedied by a broader development of social life on higher planes.

In conclusion, it is hardly too much to say that economic activity is at the very basis of society. Economic changes and crises result in changes and crises in all phases of social life; as for example, the effect of depression in business on marriage and birth rate, which Buckle has attempted to trace. Habits of industry are at the basis of political stability. Industrial connection has often preceded political connection even as to-day commerce is the strongest influence in the development of international law. Higher types of intellectual, moral, and religious life can only be developed where men are protected from the constant pressure of want and the constant fear of starvation. And the work-habit, developed so slowly in the course of industrial progress, is no less necessary than leisure for genuine psychical progress. The economic structure of society is the real bases

on which the juridical and political superstructure is raised, and to which definite forms of social thought correspond; in short the mode of production determines the character of the social, political, and intellectual life generally.

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